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From Guns that Do Not Shoot to
Foreign Staplers
HAS THE SUPREME COURT’S MATERIALITY
STANDARD UNDER ESCOBAR PROVIDED CLARITY
FOR THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY ABOUT FRAUD
UNDER THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT?
Deborah R. Farringer†
INTRODUCTION
It all started out simply enough. Members of Congress
became aware of stories involving rampant fraud against the
federal government: Brooks Brothers, a government contractor
that during the Civil War contracted to manufacture 12,000
uniforms for the Union Army, glued together “shredded, often
decaying rags, pressed them into a semblance of cloth, and
sewed the pieces into uniforms,” which promptly disintegrated
upon being exposed to rain for the first time, all in an effort to
maximize profit on the contract;1 Army Quartermasters
purchased the same mules again and again from suppliers; the
government procured infantry boots for Union soldiers that were
made of cardboard and would wear out after only a mile’s long
march.2 Thus, in an effort to curb the “grossest frauds upon the
Government,”3 the U.S. Congress enacted the False Claims Act
† Deborah R. Farringer is an Assistant Professor of Law at Belmont
University College of Law in Nashville, TN. J.D., Vanderbilt University Law School;
B.A., University of San Diego. I would like to thank my research assistants Andy
Goldstein and Kimberly MacDonald for their work and help in bringing this article to
fruition. Thanks also to Anne Conroy and all of the editorial staff of Brooklyn Law Review
for their very helpful suggestions and edits to this article. Finally, thank you to my
husband and children for their never-ending patience and support.
1 Ron Soodalter, The Union’s ‘Shoddy’ Aristocracy, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR
(May 9, 2011, 9:30 PM), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/09/the-unionsshoddy-aristocracy [http://perma.cc/J9H8-4WME].
2 James B. Helmer, Jr., False Claims Act: Incentivizing Integrity for 150 Years
for Rogues, Privateers, Parasites and Patriots, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1261, 1264 (2013) (citing
132 CONG. REC. H6482 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Berman); CONG.
GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 955 (1863)).
3 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 956.
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(FCA).4 Utilizing a legal mechanism originating in England
known as a qui tam suit,5 the FCA, enacted March 2, 1863,
permits both private individuals and the federal government
(through the U.S. district attorneys’ offices) to file an action in
court on behalf of the United States against a government
contractor believed to have knowingly submitted false claims to
the federal government for payment.6
During the 150-plus years since enactment of the FCA, it
has become one of the federal government’s most successful
enforcement mechanisms against government contractors and
in no industry has it been more impactful than in health care.7
While it was clear in 1863 that selling the same mule to the
federal government over and over was fraud, in the complicated
and highly regulated structure of the U.S. health care system,
with multiple federal health care programs that provide
payment and services to individuals in various forms,
identifying fraud has become increasingly challenging.8 If
knowingly billing the federal government for a physician visit
that never actually took place is the submission of a “false claim”
to the federal government,9 what about billing for a service that,
4 False Claims Act, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (1863) (codified as amended at 31
U.S.C. § 3729 et seq. (2012)).
5 Helmer, supra note 2, at 1262 (noting that “the concept of enlisting members
of the public to protect the King’s property is actually hundreds of years old” and that the
suits are “called qui tam actions because they are brought by a person qui tam pro domino
rege quam pro si ipso in hac parte sequitur, that is, ‘[w]ho sues on behalf of the king as well
as for himself.’” (quoting Qui Tam Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990))).
6 False Claims Act, 12 Stat. at 696–99.
7 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Over $4.7
Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2016 (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-47-billion-false-claims-act-casesfiscal-year-2016 [http://perma.cc/U3Z5-8SC3] [hereinafter Justice Dep’t Recovers Over
$4.7 Billion] (reporting that, in fiscal year 2016, the health care industry accounted for
over 53 percent of the total recovery under the FCA); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Justice Department Recovers From False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2017 (Dec.
21, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-37-billion-falseclaims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2017 [https://perma.cc/PP7Q-BVQ3] [hereinafter Justice Dep’t
Recovers Over $3.7 Billion] (reporting that, in fiscal year 2017, the health care industry
accounted for $2.4 billion of the $3.7 billion total that was collected, which equals just
over 64 percent).
8 Federal health care program is defined as “(1) any plan or program that
provides health benefits, whether directly, through insurance, or otherwise, which is
funded directly, in whole or in part, by the United States Government . . .; or (2) any
State health care program, as defined in Section 1320a-7(h).” 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(f)
(2012). The Office of Inspector General has not created an official list of federal health
care programs that qualify under the definition, so the exact number of federal health
care programs is not entirely know. See Judith A. Waltz & Adam Hepworth, Medicare
and Medicaid Administrative Enforcement, 4 HEALTH L. HANDBOOK § 1:4 (2017).
9 The Office of Inspector General issued a Special Fraud Alert in 1996 stating
definitively that billing for services that were never rendered is fraud. Publication of OIG
Special Fraud Alert: Fraud and Abuse in the Provision of Services in Nursing Facilities,
61 Fed. Reg. 30,623 (June 17, 1996).
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under applicable state licensure law, was required to be provided
by a licensed psychiatrist but was instead provided by a
registered nurse?10 If knowingly billing the federal government
for a service to a complex patient with multiple co-morbidities
when the service was actually provided to a non-complex patient
with no co-morbidities is the submission of a “false claim,”11 what
about billing for a home health service on a date that is prior to
when a physician actually certifies the need for such home
health services in a face-to-face visit as required under
applicable Medicare regulations?12
For health care entities subject to the FCA, these
questions are not just an academic exercise, but present real
issues and problems for purposes of compliance. Not only might
noncompliance with regulations present potential FCA liability
as a result of a qui tam relator claim, but retention of known
overpayments is also actionable as a false claim.13 Thus, entities
subject to the FCA need to know and understand when and in
what circumstances noncompliance with regulations constitutes
a false or fraudulent claim in order to not only correct the
problem, but also remit known overpayments.14 Clear guidance
and direction regarding what does or does not constitute fraud
under the FCA is paramount.
While the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and qui tam
relators’15 counsel have been arguing for over twenty years that
10 See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct.
1989, 1997 (2016) (involving a claim that certain false representations, such as a nurse
prescribing medication as a psychiatrist without appropriate licensing, violate the False
Claims Act).
11 See, e.g., United States v. Larm, 824 F.2d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1987) (involving
a case in which the physician and his wife billed for an examination or evaluation related
to a new treatment or illness for routine allergy shots that were administered only by
the physician’s nurse). This sort of scheme is often referred to as upcoding, or “DRG
creep,” in the hospital context, in which the hospital bills for a service at a higher
reimbursement rate than is necessary for the patient. See DAVID E. MATYAS ET AL.,
LEGAL ISSUES IN HEALTHCARE FRAUD AND ABUSE: NAVIGATING THE UNCERTAINTIES 267–
68 (4th ed. 2012).
12 See United States ex rel. Prather v. Brookdale Senior Living Cmtys., Inc.,
838 F.3d 750, 758–59 (6th Cir. 2016) (involving a case in which home health service was
provided before the required physician certification of the service).
13 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2012).
14 Id.
15 A qui tam relator is the name given to those individuals who file a lawsuit
under the FCA on behalf of the federal government. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1). These
individuals are also often referred to as whistleblowers. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687,
692 (2d. Cir. 2001), abrogated by Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989; see also Thomas R. Lee, The
Standing of Qui Tam Relators Under the False Claims Act, 57 U. CHI. L. REV 543, 543
(1990) (“The qui tam provision of the Act authorizes private individuals to adopt the
government’s cause of action and sue on behalf of the United States. These qui tam
plaintiffs, or ‘relators,’ receive a ‘bounty’ of up to thirty percent of the damage award or
settlement, plus expenses, attorney fees, and costs of suit.” (footnotes omitted)).
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all of the above-referenced instances are false claims,16 the
various federal circuit courts have not shared widespread
agreement on whether all such examples necessarily constitute
“fraud” under the FCA in all instances.17 The distinction between
these examples lies in whether the alleged fraud is based on
misleading or fraudulent facts submitted on the claim form
regarding the services provided or based on misleading or
fraudulent certification on the claim form implying that the
claimant provided such services in compliance with all applicable
underlying laws, rules, and regulations.18 Courts have referred to
the latter example as an “implied false certification.”19 While most
courts were in agreement that FCA liability did extend to cover
at least some forms of implied false certification claims, there
was a lack of consensus about how far to extend such liability in
these sorts of claims.20 Then, in the case of Universal Health
Services, Inc. v. U.S. ex rel. Escobar,21 the Supreme Court sought
to clarify (a) whether the FCA could be used by both qui tam
relators and the government to sustain a claim that a
contractor’s failure to comply with certain underlying regulatory
16 Although not so named, the so-called “implied false certification” theory of
liability, which will be explained in more detail in Part II of this article, seemed to first
be recognized in the cases of Ab-Tech Const., Inc. v. United States. Ab-Tech Const., Inc.
v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429, 434 (1994), aff ’ d, 57 F.3d 1084 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (stating
that the use of payment vouchers as implied certifications resulted in fraudulent claims);
see also Mikes, 274 F.3d at 699 (“The implied certification theory was applied in Ab-Tech
Construction, Inc. . . . .”).
17 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Medical, Inc., 647
F.3d 377, 385–88 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 626 F.3d
1257, 1268–69 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Mikes, 274 F.3d at 697 (joining the position of only four
circuit courts regarding what is required for a claim to be false under the FCA).
18 Some circuit courts have described this distinction as a claim being either
“factually false” or “legally false”; that is, is the falsity based on facts regarding the
service itself or is the falsity because the claimant fails to comply with a legal
requirement (even if the service itself was provided and information on the claim form
regarding the actual service is true and correct.). See, e.g., Mikes, 274 F.3d at 697.
19 Id. at 699. The name “implied false certification” was first utilized by a
district court in the case of United States ex rel. Mikes v. Straus, although the general
concept had been recognized by other courts prior to this case. See United States ex rel.
Mikes v. Straus, 84 F. Supp. 2d 427, 434–37 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting that while the
Second Circuit had not yet considered this theory of fraud, it had been considered and
utilized by the Federal Court of Claims in Ab-Tech Constr., Inc., and while rejected for
certain cases based on the facts of such case, recognized as being utilized “only in those
exceptional circumstances where the claimant’s adherence to the relevant statutory or
regulatory mandates lies at the core of its agreement with the Government, or, in more
practical terms, where the Government would have refused to pay had it been aware of
the claimant’s non-compliance.”). Note that courts have also recognized a theory known
as “express false certification,” which is the name utilized when compliance with a
particular law, rule, or regulation is expressly a condition to submission of the claim form
itself. See Mikes, 274 F.3d at 697–98.
20 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
21 See generally Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar,
136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016).

2018]

GUNS THAT DO NOT SHOOT & FOREIGN STAPLERS

1231

requirements constitutes a false claim by virtue of the implied
certification that the contractor makes in order to receive
payment; and, if yes, (b) whether such underlying regulation is
required to be a precondition to payment (i.e., the government
will not pay the claim unless the claimant complies with such
regulation).22
The Court quieted at least part of the existing debate, finding
that the implied false certification theory can be utilized as a basis
for liability under the FCA in certain instances.23 It perhaps fueled
a greater debate, however, in rejecting the strict limitation regarding
such underlying law, rule, or regulation being a precondition to
payment and holding instead that any liability requires a showing
that the claimant’s “misrepresentation about compliance with a
statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement . . . be material to
the Government’s payment decision.”24
Abandoning the need for a detailed analysis into the
basis and intention behind myriad regulations,25 the unanimous
Court indicated a need to return to legal fundamentals,
providing guidance based on common law principles for
establishment of materiality.26 Seemingly, the Court’s guidance
Id. at 1995–96.
Id. at 1999.
24 Id. at 1996 (emphasis added). With this holding, the Court abrogated Mikes,
which held that the “implied false certification is appropriately applied only when the
underlying statute or regulation upon which the plaintiff relies expressly states the
provider must comply in order to be paid.” Mikes, 274 F.3d at 700 (emphasis in original).
Recognition of the idea that liability could exist under the FCA was adopted by nearly
all circuits. See United States ex rel. Quinn v. Omnicare, Inc., 382 F.3d 432, 441 (3d Cir.
2004). Only some courts, however, have also recognized that such claims would be
limited to those regulations that are a condition to payment. See Chesbrough v. VPA,
P.C., 655 F.3d 461, 467–68 (6th Cir. 2011) (acknowledging that the theory of implied
false certification was adopted by United States ex rel. Augustine v. Century Health
Servs., Inc., 289 F.3d 409, 415 (6th Cir. 2002), but failing to find liability under the
implied false certification theory because the plaintiffs failed to allege that the Medicare
regulation in question did not “require compliance with an industry standard as a
prerequisite to payment.”); United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d
1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that the theory of implied false certification was
recognized by United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1996));
Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 784 (4th Cir. 1999); United
States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 902 (5th Cir.
1997); Ab-Tech Constr., Inc., 31 Fed. Cl. at 434. But see United States ex rel. Hutcheson
v. Blackstone Medical, Inc., 647 F.3d 377, 385–88 (1st Cir. 2011) (finding that a
regulation be a precondition of payment is not found in the text of the FCA); United
States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1268–69 (D.C. Cir. 2010); United
States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Regional Health Center, Inc., 543 F.3d 1211, 1218 (10th
Cir. 2008).
25 The usual analysis for determining whether a regulation was a condition of
participation or a condition of payment often involved detailed analysis about where in
the statute such regulation was located. See United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United
Health Group, Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 309 (3d Cir. 2015).
26 See Joan H. Krause, Reflection on Certification, Interpretation, and the Quest for
Fraud that “Counts” Under the False Claims Act, 5 UNIV. OF ILL. L. REV. 1811, 1813 (2017).
22
23
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was intended to assist contractors in understanding what might
matter for purposes of compliance with a vast number of federal
and state laws and regulations to which government contractors
are subject, especially federal health care program participants.27
So, as federal district courts and courts of appeals attempt to
apply the Court’s dictates in Escobar, it is necessary to ask
whether the Court succeeded in easing the complexity of this
aspect of the FCA. Have lower courts been able to consistently
apply the new standards to assess materiality? Or, has the
opinion, which arguably both broadened and narrowed
application of the implied false certificate theory and when
liability might attach,28 further muddied the waters for courts
and parties attempting to determine whether behavior is of the
sort that qualifies as “fraud”? Most importantly, what impact
has the Escobar opinion had on providers and other government
contractors for purposes of trying to determine whether
noncompliance with a regulation of any sort constitutes fraud for
purposes of the FCA?
In reviewing lower court opinions analyzing FCA claims
in accordance with the dictates of Escobar, this article argues
that while Escobar does seem to be motivating lower courts to
apply a rigorous and demanding materiality standard, the
Court’s “back-to-basics” approach in determining materiality
seems to be providing little consistency regarding what type of
evidence would need to be proffered to satisfy the new
materiality standard. To the extent such lack of consistency
endures, providers, suppliers, manufacturers, and other parties
potentially subject to application of the FCA in the health care
setting will continue to struggle to determine how to consider
Escobar for purposes of assessing and prioritizing compliance risk.
Part I of this article briefly examines the history of the
FCA and explores how the FCA has evolved as the primary
enforcement tool for health care fraud and abuse. This Part
27 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2001. The Court adopted a two-part test for what sorts
of claims might qualify as viable implied false certification claims under the FCA. Id.
The details of the two-part test and how lower courts are interpreting such test is
addressed in Part II, infra.
28 As will be explored more fully in Part II, infra, the opinion seems to broaden
application of the implied false certification theory on the basis that it potentially opened
up the possibility of types of implied false certification claims that would have been
rejected under a stricter application requiring that only such regulations that are
conditions of payment, and not conditions of participation, would qualify for purposes of
implied false certification liability. See Mikes, 274 F.3d at 700. The Court then narrowed
application of this theory, however, when it stated definitively that such claims must be
limited by materiality and such materiality standards should be demanding, so as to
avoid application of the FCA as “an all-purpose antifraud statute.” See Escobar, 136 S. Ct.
at 2003 (quoting Allison Engine v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 672 (2008)).
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further examines the origins of the implied false certification
theory and the various splits and issues among the circuit courts
that prompted the Supreme Court to review this issue in
Escobar. In Part II, this article examines the details of the
Escobar case and outlines the specific findings of the Supreme
Court as well as how the DOJ, federal district courts, and federal
courts of appeals have interpreted the Escobar opinion. Then,
Part II analyzes the approaches of various courts in applying the
new materiality standard to examine the impact the standard
will have on future FCA cases relying on the implied false
certification theory. It further highlights consistent themes,
open questions, or distinctions that have emerged since the
issuance of the Escobar opinion. Next, Part III argues that while
Escobar may succeed in ensuring a more exacting and
demanding standard for claims relying on an implied false
certification theory, and thus a broader number of defenses
available to defendants involved in FCA cases, the lack of
consistency for specific types of proof that constitute materiality
will have a detrimental effect on ongoing compliance efforts by
those entities subject to the FCA. These challenges will be
particularly acute for health care entities, including providers
and suppliers, in trying to prioritize and assess risk and in
operation of effective compliance programs under the countless
regulations to which such entities are subject. Finally, this
article concludes by offering some suggestions for potentially
mitigating or lessening some of the confusion that might arise
through the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
and other state regulatory agencies by issuing clear and precise
communication about what types of fraud those agencies believe
should be actionable under the FCA.
I.

BACKGROUND

A.

History of the False Claims Act

Although use and application of the FCA has gone
through various changes since its 1863 enactment, the goals of
the FCA today are not too dissimilar to this description of the
purpose of the law declared in 1943:
[The False Claims Act] is intended to protect the treasury against the
hungry and unscrupulous host that encompasses it on every side, and
should be construed accordingly. It was passed upon the
theory . . . that one of the least expensive and most effective means of
preventing frauds on the treasury is to make the perpetrators of them
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liable to actions by private persons acting . . . under the strong
stimulus of personal ill will or the hope of gain.29

The concept of incentivizing private individuals to report
suspected fraud may be somewhat novel under the bulk of
today’s laws, but this legal mechanism was actually quite
common in the early history of the United States.30 Adopted from
English tradition, laws that not only relied on, but also
encouraged and incentivized private individuals to seek recovery
and reward on behalf of the federal government were rather
typical and found to be a relatively effective means of
prosecuting crimes.31 When enacting what was sometimes
referred to as the “Informer’s Act” or “Lincoln’s Law,”32 Congress
recognized that a monetary reward (then 50 percent of the
recovery amount) would be strong incentive for an individual to
“betray[ ] his co-conspirator.”33 By the mid-1940s, the federal
government had established the Department of Justice (DOJ)
and the need for private citizens to alert the government to bad
actors as a means for prosecution began to lessen due to the new
role of a federal prosecutor.34
As a result of the new agency and the thought that the
DOJ should be able to appropriately prosecute fraud against the
government, many began to become concerned that the FCA was
actually feeding “parasitic” lawsuits.35 Thus, a 1943 amendment
greatly cut back on the incentives, and consequently the use of
the FCA by qui tam relators.36 For the next forty-plus years, use
29 United States v. Griswold, 24 F. 361, 366 (D. Or. 1885); see also Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 949 (1997) (citing United
States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n.5 (1943)).
30 See Helmer, supra note 2, at 1263 (noting that ten to twelve of the first fourteen
laws to be enacted under the first Continental Congress of the United States authorized qui
tam suits).
31 Id. at 1263–64.
32 See United States ex rel. Graber v. City of New York, 8 F. Supp. 2d 343, 352
(S.D.N.Y. 1998).
33 Helmer, supra note 2, at 1265–66 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 37th CONG., 3D
SESS. 955 (1863) (statement of Sen. Howard)).
34 Id. at 1267 (“As a result of WWII, a whole new class of war profiteers
surfaced. But unlike 1863, by 1943 the federal government had a Department of Justice,
including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which pursued criminal prosecutions
against some government contractors.”).
35 In re United States ex rel. S. Prawer and Co. v. Fleet Bank of Maine, 24 F.3d
320, 324 (1st Cir. 1994) (“During the New Deal and World War II, there was a notable
increase in the number of contracts awarded by the government to private individuals
and entities. Along with this increase came a concomitant surge in the number of qui
tam actions brought by relators under the FCA. This litigational surge, in turn, brought
to the fore the fact that the qui tam provisions then in effect were too susceptible to abuse
by ‘parasitic’ relators.” (internal citations omitted)).
36 Id. at 325 (noting that the amendment essentially prohibited any claim by a
relator that was “based on evidence or information the Government had when the action
was brought” (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4) (1982))).
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of the FCA as a mechanism for identifying and prosecuting fraud
was extremely limited.37 In fact, it was so limited that, due to
Congress’s concern that widespread fraud was draining the
public fisc, it amended the FCA in 1986 to strike a better balance
between incentivizing relators to report fraud and also
preventing parasitic lawsuits.38
Although the FCA has been amended on a few occasions
since 1986, it was this more extensive amendment in 1986 that
gave rise to the modern day application of the FCA.39 Indeed,
with an average annual recovery of almost $4 billion in federal
money since 2009,40 there is little question that in recent years
the FCA has become an extremely powerful tool for the federal
Id.
False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153
(codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq. (2012)). These changes were
accomplished primarily by adding an original source provision as an exception to the
prohibition against government knowledge and enacting other provisions that attempted
to achieve the “twin goals of rejecting suits which the government is capable of pursuing
itself, while promoting those which the government is not equipped to bring on its own.”
United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Railway Co., v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 651 (D.C.
Cir. 1994); see also James B. Helmer, Jr. & Robert Clark Neff, Jr., War Stories: A History
of the Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act, The 1986 Amendments to the False
Claims Act, and their Application in the United States ex rel. Gravitt v. General Electric
Co. Litigation, 18 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 35, 44 (1991). Helmer and Neff note that the changes
to the FCA included loosening the knowledge requirement, increasing penalties for
violations of the FCA, permitting the qui tam relator to pursue the claim even if the
federal government chose not to intervene, increasing the relator’s share of the proceeds
from no greater than 10 percent to 25 percent and an even greater recovery for relators
proceeding on his/her own, and altering the bar against claims in which the government
had prior knowledge (often referred to as the public disclosure bar) to permit these claims
to the extent that the relator could claim to be an “original source,” as defined in the
statute. Id. at 45–50.
39 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Celebrates 25th
Anniversary of False Claims Act Amendments of 1986 (Jan. 31, 2012), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-celebrates-25th-anniversary-false-claims-actamendments-1986 [http://perma.cc/BM8A-CX7N] (“The False Claims Act has been called
the single most important tool that American taxpayers have to recover funds when false
claims are made to the federal government, including health care fraud, mortgage fraud,
and procurement fraud. ‘In the last quarter century, the False Claim Act’s success has been
unparalleled with more than $30 billion dollars recovered since it was amended in 1986
and $8.8 billion since January 2009,’ said Attorney General Eric Holder.”).
40 Justice Dep’t Recovers Over $4.7 Billion, supra note 7. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et
seq. can be used to recover money improperly paid to or retained by entities or person
who contract with the federal government. There are certain programs, such as state
Medicaid programs, that involve a mix of federal and state funding and therefore many
False Claims Act cases include allegations regarding not just fraud against the federal
government, but also against state programs that include both state and federal funding.
Thus, utilizing similar state false claims statutes, there are often portions of a recovery
that inure back to states. Robin Rudowitz, Medicaid Financing: The Basics, KAISER
FAMILY FOUND. (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.kff.org/report-section/medicaid-financingthe-basics-issue-brief/ [https://perma.cc/DTE2-8EBC] (describing the Medicaid program
as a program in which the “federal government matches state spending for eligible
beneficiaries and qualifying services”); see also Medicaid Fraud Control Units—MFCUs,
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/medicaid-fraud-controlunits-mfcu/index.asp [https://perma.cc/WDS4-W59F].
37
38
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government to identify fraud and recover money that has been
improperly paid to, or retained by, government contractors.41
The DOJ has reported that 60 percent of its FCA recoveries since
1986 have come in the last eight years42 and the total recovery
since 1986 is over $36 billion.43
B.

Health Care and the False Claims Act

Much of the $36 billion recovery has arisen out of claims
from the health care industry, which includes providers (e.g.,
hospitals, physicians, nursing homes, etc.), pharmaceutical
companies, medical device manufacturers, and suppliers (e.g.,
laboratories, durable medical equipment companies, ambulance
services, etc.).44 Any entity or individual participating in a
federal health care program, including Medicare and Medicaid,
or any entity or individual supplying items, goods, or services
that are reimbursable by a federal health care program—even if
such entity or individual does not, by itself, contract with the
federal government—is potentially liable under the FCA.45
Given the breadth of the FCA’s language and the structure of
the U.S. health care system, it is not surprising that the FCA
has become the primary enforcement mechanism for confronting
health care fraud for the federal government46 and has become
equally big business for relators.47 With over fifty-eight million
Justice Dep’t Recovers Over $4.7 Billion, supra note 7.
Id.; Justice Dep’t Recovers Over $3.7 Billion, supra note 7.
43 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DIV., FRAUD STATISTICS—HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES 2017 [hereinafter FRAUD STATISTICS], https://www.justice.gov/opa/pressrelease/file/1020116/download [https://perma.cc/G5K4-CBJH] (citing statistics between
October 1, 1986 through September 30, 2017).
44 See, e.g., Justice Dep’t Recovers Over $4.7 Billion, supra note 7 (stating that
in 2016, of the $4.7 billion recovered of federal dollars, almost $2.5 billion was monies
recovered from the health care industry); Justice Dep’t Recovers Over $3.7 Billion, supra
note 7 (stating that in 2017, of the $3.7 billion recovered of federal dollars, almost $2.4
billion was monies recovered from the health care industry).
45 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (applies to “any person who (A) knowingly presents, or
causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval; (B) knowingly
makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false
or fraudulent claim; . . . (G) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false
record or statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the
Government, or knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an
obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government”).
46 Justice Dep’t Recovers Over $4.7 Billion, supra note 7.
47 Id. (noting that of the 702 qui tam cases that were filed, 501 of them (71
percent) were health care related and recovery from health care qui tam relators
accounted for 93 percent of the total health care recovery of almost $2.5 billion total
recovery amount). It should be noted that although the percentage of FCA cases that are
filed by a qui tam relator are high, the recovery amount for cases in which the federal
government declines to intervene remain low. In 2016, the percentage of recovery that
was attributed to non-intervened cases was 2 percent. This percentage is consistent with
the average percentage of recovery in years’ past, with the exception of 2015 in which
41
42
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Medicare beneficiaries and over seventy-two million Medicaid
beneficiaries in the United States,48 there are few hospitals,
physicians, or other providers or suppliers that do not
participate in federal health care programs.49 Thus, application
of the FCA extends nearly universal reach over all players in the
health care industry.
In addition to the ability to apply FCA provisions to
nearly all sectors of the health care industry, the potential
damages and liability that could be imposed under the FCA is a
further factor that has made the FCA such a powerful and
effective enforcement tool. Violations of the FCA include (1) an
obligation to remit to the federal government any payments
made by the government pursuant to a claim that is considered
to be false, (2) the ability for the federal government to seek
treble damages on the total amount of the payments to be
remitted to the government, and (3) the ability for the federal
government to impose fines ranging from $10,781.40 to
$21,562.80 per claim submitted.50 Additionally, to the extent
relators in cases in which the federal government declined to intervene accounted for 32
percent of the total recovery. FRAUD STATISTICS, supra note 43. While it is difficult to tell
for sure, it seems likely that 2015 was an outlier as opposed to a new trend.
48 C TRS . FOR M EDICARE & M EDICAID S ERVS ., CMS F AST F ACTS (2018),
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/CMS-Fast-Facts/index.html [https://perma.cc/BSU5-ZUTX].
49 Id. at 8–9. According to Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS),
in calendar year 2016, there were 6,146 total hospitals participating in Medicare, along
with 11,956 home health agencies, 15,274 skilled nursing facilities, 254,133 labs, 2,080
outpatient physical therapy/speech pathology facilities, 4,153 rural health clinics, 7,723
federally qualified health centers, 5,529 ambulatory surgical centers, 193 comprehensive
outpatient rehabilitation facilities, and 4,473 hospices. Also, there are 1,249,691 total
non-institutional providers (e.g., physicians and nurse practitioners) participating in the
Medicare program. It is difficult to glean what such participation is as a percentage
relative to total hospitals, as available data does not necessarily track the same data
points. For example, the American Hospital Association (AHA) in 2018 states that there
is a total of 5,534 “registered” hospitals in the U.S. AM. HOSP. ASS’N, FAST FACTS ON U.S.
HOSPITALS (2018), https://www.aha.org/system/files/2018-02/2018-aha-hospital-fastfacts.pdf [https://perma.cc/8N78-HVZ2]. “Registered hospitals are those hospitals that
meet the AHA’s criteria for registration” that may or may not also be members of the
AHA. Id. Individual provider statistics are also challenging, but based on census data
there were approximately 916,264 actively licensed physicians in the U.S. See Aaron
Young et al., A Census of Actively Licensed Physicians in the United States, 2014, 101 J.
MED. REG. 8, 11 (2015).
50 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1); False Claims Act Penalties, FINDLAW (2018),
http://employment.findlaw.com/whistleblowers/false-claims-act-penalties.html [https://
perma.cc/EC2L-AUBT] (“Under the text of the FCA, those who submit fraudulent claims
to the government are subject to a civil penalty of between $5,000 and $10,000 for each
claim. However, because the Act allows for inflationary adjustments, as of 2016, violators
now face penalties of between $10,781.40 and $21,562.80 per claim.”). The civil penalty
assessed per claim was increased as of February 3, 2017 to the limits referenced above.
Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation Adjustment for 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 9131, 9133 (Feb. 3,
2017) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a)(9)). Note that with respect to what amounts
are necessary to be remitted, courts have taken different approaches regarding what
might constitute the amount of the overpayment. Some prosecutors have sought, and
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that an FCA claim is based on an underlying violation of the
Antikickback Statute51 or knowing violation of the Physician
Self-Referral Statute (otherwise known as the Stark Law),52 not
only would the penalties under the FCA apply, but penalties for
violations of the Antikickback Statute and Stark Law would also
apply, adding additional penalties of $21,916 per claim for each
violation of the Antikickback Statute53 and penalties ranging
from a maximum of $24,253 per claim or $161,692 for a
fraudulent scheme under the Stark Law.54
Given the potential penalties and damages associated
with the FCA, not to mention reimbursement of funds (often for
services that were in fact rendered), liability under the FCA is
an incredibly high-stakes game for those in the health care
industry. It also means the possibility of a very lucrative
monetary “reward,” or windfall, to a potential whistleblower who
might be willing to bring the claim.55 It is this combination of
factors that has made the FCA such an effective tool for the
federal government and such a source of stress and
consternation for providers, suppliers, manufacturers, and

courts have awarded, any and all monies paid to a provider pursuant to any claim that
is considered fraudulent. Other courts have sought only the difference between the
amount that was paid in excess of the amount that would have been paid if the service
had been billed properly (e.g., the difference between the reimbursement paid for the
appropriate DRG level vs. the amount paid for the highest DRG level). See United States
v. Mackby, 339 F.3d 1013, 1017 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that the judgment against the
plaintiff did not exceed the Excessive Fines Clause because the government could have
sought damages for 8,499 claims “[s]ince the use of [fraudulent use of Mackby’s father’s
UPIN] led to liability, all 8,499 claims constitute violations of the FCA” but the
government chose to only seek damages for the claims that were submitted that exceeded
a billing cap).
51 The federal Antikickback Statute imposes penalties for “knowingly and
willfully [offering or paying] any remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate)
directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind” in return for referring “an
individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging for the furnishing of any item or
service for which payment may be made in whole or in part under a Federal health care
program . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2) (2012).
52 The Stark Law prohibits a physician (or the physician’s immediate family
member, as defined in the statute) from making referrals for certain services known as
“designated health services” to any entity with which the physician has a “financial
relationship.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(1).
53 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a)(13) (2017). The penalties were increased on February 3,
2017. Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation Adjustment for 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. at 9133 (Feb.
3, 2017) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a)(13)).
54 Annual Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation Adjustment, 82 Fed. Reg. 9174,
9179–80 (Feb. 3, 2017) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 1003.310).
55 While the percentage of the qui tam relator’s “award” has varied since 1863,
current recovery amounts under Section 3730(d)(1) are “at least 15 percent but not more
than 25 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of the claim” for suits in which
the federal government intervenes and under Section 3730(d)(2) are “not less than 25
percent and not more than 30 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement.” 31
U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)–(2).
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others potentially liable under this statute.56 Facing penalties
and damages sometimes upward of hundreds of millions of
dollars, these devastating outcomes have pushed a majority of
defendants to settle their claims.57 Even if the claims may be
explainable or defensible or when the relators might have only
part of the facts, when faced with the possibility of an FCA suit
many entities will settle such claims with the federal
government in lieu of taking their chances with the court
system.58 In fact, of the “Significant False Claims Act
Settlements & Judgment” reported by the federal government
for years 2009–2016, only one of the forty reported cases were
judgments as opposed to settlements.59
This is not to say that the mere filing of an FCA claim
equals success on the merits or that a defendant is unable to ever
successfully defeat an FCA claim. On the contrary, the vast
majority of amounts recovered in FCA cases result from cases in
which the U.S. government has intervened, amounting to only
about 25 percent of all qui tam cases.60 While there has been an
upward trend in success of qui tam relators who proceed on their
own (i.e., achieve settlement or a favorable judgment after the
DOJ has declined to intervene), defendants are ultimately
successful in defeating most qui tam claims that qui tam relators

56 Ryan Winkler, Note, The Civil False Claims Act and its Unreasonably Broad
Scope of Liability: The Need for Real “Clarifications” Following the Fraud Enforcement
and Recovery Act of 2009, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 533, 551–52 (2012).
57 It is difficult to glean from existing public data sources the sheer number of
settlements versus judgments under the FCA, as the data that is reported is reported as
amounts recovered from both settlements and judgments. Reading between the lines a
little on some of the information reported, it seems the vast majority of major cases are
settled and thus a majority of the monetary recovery amounts are settlements as opposed
to successful judgments in court. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET:
SIGNIFICANT FALSE CLAIMS ACT SETTLEMENTS & JUDGEMENTS FISCAL YEARS 2009–2016
(2016) [hereinafter FACT SHEET], https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/918366/
download [http://perma.cc/HKY8-D2RX] (citing to a total of forty major recoveries in
seven years and $19.3 billion in recovery amounts and noting that only one of the forty
cases involved a judgment versus a settlement agreement).
58 See id.
59 Id. It should be noted that of those cases that were considered “Health Care
Fraud” all reported cases involved settlements. The one case that resulted from a
judgment was part of the “Other Fraud Recoveries” category and involved a global
financial institution that was found to have violated the Department of Agriculture’s
Supplier Credit Guarantee Program. Id. at 10–11.
60 Eric Topor, Intervention in False Claims Act Lawsuits: Is It Make or Break?,
BLOOMBERG LAW (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.bna.com/intervention-false-claimsn73014460786/ [https://perma.cc/4W4B-F6DA]. Note that there are also a portion of FCA
claims that are filed directly by the DOJ in its capacity. For example, in the year 2016,
approximately 4 percent of the total amount recovered under the FCA resulted from nonqui tam cases. Id.; see also Justice Dep’t Recovers Over $3.7 Billion, supra note 7 (noting
that $3.4 billion of the $3.7 billion in total recovery was due to qui tam lawsuits and a
total of 669 qui tam lawsuits filed).
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pursue in their own capacity.61 Thus, while the threat of the
government intervening in the claim often encourages settlement,
the ability to avoid a government intervention may actually
result in greater ability of the defendant to succeed in defeating
the claim. The threat of the potential penalties and likelihood of
success after the government has intervened, however, is so
great that despite some success in non-intervened cases,62 entities
are nevertheless motivated to settle any alleged claims.
1. The Rise of Implied False Certification Cases
As use of the FCA increased following the 1986
amendments, so too did the sophistication and expansion of the
types of claims that might be actionable under the FCA. In
reviewing FCA jurisprudence between 1986 and 1994, most
claims alleged fraud through factual misrepresentations
regarding the services themselves, such as physicians billing for
services that were never rendered,63 clinics billing for services
that were not medically necessary,64 or providers billing for
higher levels of care than were actually provided.65 In addition
to allegations of these “factually false” claims,66 prosecutors and
relators began alleging fraud arising out of misrepresentations
61 Topor, supra note 60 (noting that 23 percent of the total recovery of $1.9
billion in 2015 was attributable to non-intervened cases, but clarifying that of that $512
million in recovery that was attributable to non-intervened cases, $472 million was due
to a settlement with DaVita). While many have characterized what happened in 2015 as
an anomaly, 2017 saw another spike in success of qui tam relators when the DOJ has
not intervened with a total recovery of $425 million of the $3.7 billion total recovery. See
FRAUD STATISTICS, supra note 43.
62 See Topor, supra note 60.
63 See United States v. Krizek, 859 F. Supp. 5, 8–12 (1994) (finding liability
under the FCA for a psychiatrist who submitted bills for services that far exceeded the
amount of time that the psychiatrist spent providing the services); The OIG also issued
two Special Fraud Alerts in 1995 and 1996 in response to behavior noted over the past
decade of providers billing for services never rendered or for greater services than were
actually rendered. See, e.g., Publication of OIG Special Fraud Alert: Home Health Fraud,
Fraud and Abuse in the Provision of Medical Supplies to Nursing Facilities, 60 Fed. Reg.
40847, 40848 (Aug. 10, 1995) (providing examples of home health visits that were never
made, visits to beneficiaries who are not in fact homebound, visits to beneficiaries not
requiring a qualifying service, and visits not authorized by a physician); Publication of
OIG Special Fraud Alert: Fraud and Abuse in the Provision of Services in Nursing
Homes, 61 Fed. Reg. 30, 623–24 (June 17, 1996) (providing an example in a Special Fraud
Alert about a physician who billed $350,000 for examinations of nursing home residents,
even though he never physically saw a single resident).
64 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Gambro Healthcare Agrees to
Pay Over $350 Million to Resolve Civil & Criminal Allegations in Medicare Fraud Case
(Dec. 2, 2004), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2004/December/04_civ_774.htm
[https://perma.cc/UFZ6-UWYB].
65 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
66 See Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 697 (2d Cir. 2001), abrogated by
Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016).
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related to compliance with an underlying statute, law, or
regulation.67 This was first recognized as a viable claim in the
case of Ab-Tech Construction, Inc. v. United States. In Ab-Tech,
the alleged false claim was that an executive certified compliance
with the eligibility requirements under the then-current version
of the Small Business Act,68 but the company was not in
compliance with certain aspects of such law.69
As the viability of this type of claim began to take hold in
various courts, it also made its way into the health care context,
with the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
providing the most comprehensive analysis of this issue—in the
case of Mikes v. Straus.70 The Mikes court ultimately concluded
that the allegations—the relator alleged that her former
physician partners were violating the FCA because of their
failure to properly calibrate a piece of medical equipment in
accordance with industry guidelines—did not constitute a
violation of the FCA.71 The court nevertheless recognized that
violations of the FCA could encompass not only claims that make
misrepresentations about the facts of a particular claim, but
misrepresentations about legal compliance related to the
rendering of services in connection with a claim, otherwise
known as an implied false certification.72
In recognizing this as a viable claim, however, the Mikes
court was quick to identify its hesitancy about permitting this
rule to be too expansive in the health care context:
The Ab-Tech rationale, for example, does not fit comfortably into the
health care context because the False Claims Act was not designed as
a blunt instrument to enforce compliance with all medical
regulations—but rather only those regulations that are a precondition

Id. at 699.
15 U.S.C. §§ 631–697c (1988 & Supp. IV 1993).
69 See Ab-Tech Constr., Inc. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429, 434 (Fed. Cl.
1994), aff ’ d, 57 F.3d 1084 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The payment vouchers represented an
implied certification by Ab-Tech of its continuing adherence to the requirements for
participation in the 8(a) program. Therefore, by deliberately withholding from SBA
knowledge of the prohibited contract arrangement with Pyramid, Ab-Tech not only
dishonored the terms of its agreement with that agency but, more importantly, caused
the Government to pay out funds in the mistaken belief that it was furthering the aims
of the 8(a) program. In short, the Government was duped by Ab-Tech’s active
concealment of a fact vital to the integrity of that program. The withholding of such
information—information critical to the decision to pay—is the essence of a false claim.”).
70 Mikes, 274 F.3d at 696–702.
71 Id. at 699.
72 Id. (“An implied false certification claim is based on the notion that the act
of submitting a claim for reimbursement itself implies compliance with governing federal
rules that are a precondition to payment.”).
67
68
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to payment—and to construe impliedly false certification theory in an
expansive fashion would improperly broaden the Act’s reach.73

Thus, in an attempt to limit the application of this theory
of liability, the court noted that for a plaintiff to sustain an
implied false certification claim, the plaintiff must show that the
underlying statute, rule, or regulation is a condition of
payment.74 Moreover, the court specified that its requirement
that the underlying regulation be a condition of payment was
distinct from a requirement of materiality, which was a
requirement that many courts already imposed on claims arising
under the FCA.75 The court did not determine how to apply the
materiality requirement or if it should be implied, rather, it
stated: “We rule simply that not all instances of regulatory
noncompliance will cause a claim to become false. We need not
and do not address whether the Act contains a separate
materiality requirement.”76

73 Id. The court went on to also state that health care and regulation of the
provision of health services has typically been a matter of local law and thus should not
necessarily be enforced on a wide-spread basis by the federal government. Id. at 700.
74 Id. at 697. The court noted that it was following the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth,
and District of Columbia Circuits in its position regarding condition of payment;
however, it is not clear that those circuits have necessarily maintained that position. Id.
The District of Columbia Circuit later reversed its position regarding implied false
certifications. See United States v. TDC Mgmt. Corp., 288 F.3d 421, 426 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
Further, the Supreme Court in its opinion in Escobar cited to the District of Columbia
as holding in the case of United States v. Science Applications Int’l Corp. that “conditions
of payment need not be expressly designated as such to be a basis for False Claims Act
liability.” Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1999 (citing United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp.,
626 F.3d 1257, 1269 (D.C. Cir 2010)). Likewise, while the Mikes court mentions the Fifth
Circuit for supporting the theory of implied certification based on violations of conditions
of payment and the Seventh Circuit case in United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd. for
seemingly rejecting the theory of implied false certification, the Fifth Circuit has not
really asserted a specific position that aligns with either circuit. See United States v.
Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 788 F.3d 696, 711–12 (7th Cir. 2015); Mikes, 274 F.3d at 697; see
also United States ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 625 F.3d 262, 268 (5th Cir.
2010) (“The implied-certification theory of liability under the FCA ‘is based on the notion
that the act of submitting a claim for reimbursement itself implies compliance with
governing federal rules that are a precondition to payment.’ This Court has not yet
recognized the implied-certification theory. . . . We need not resolve the issue today,
because in any event the factual allegations in Steury’s amended complaint provide no
basis for implying a false certification.” (quoting Mikes, 274 F.3d at 699)).
75 See, e.g., Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 785
(4th Cir. 1999) (“Liability under each of the provisions of the False Claims Act is subject
to the further, judicially-imposed, requirement that the false statement or claim be
material. Materiality depends on ‘whether the false statement has a natural tendency to
influence agency action or is capable of influencing agency action.’” (footnote omitted)
(quoting United States ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453,
1459 (4th Cir. 1997))).
76 Mikes, 274 F.3d at 697.
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2. Circuit Splits Abound
As more and more cases alleging FCA violations related
to underlying laws, rules, or regulations made their way through
various courts, the courts have developed differing approaches
to the theory of implied false certification. Several circuit courts
agreed with the Mikes court, finding that an implied false
certification claim must be based on noncompliance with a
condition of payment.77 Contrary to the position of the Mikes
court, however, the First Circuit in United States ex rel.
Hutcheson v. Blackstone Medical, Inc. abandoned the Mikes
court’s categories and labels on the basis that such terms were
not supported by the actual text of the FCA and might narrow
the FCA in unintended ways.78 The Blackstone Medical court
further held that FCA already imposes limitations in the form of
the materiality requirement and the scienter requirement.79 In
addition to the First Circuit, the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed one of its earlier opinions, adopting the more liberal
standard first articulated in Ab-Tech and later adopted by the
First Circuit, that implied false certification claims are subject
to existing scienter and materiality requirements.80 Finally, it
should be noted that at least one circuit formerly rejected the
theory of implied false certification entirely. The Seventh
Circuit took the position that it was declining to join other
circuits recognizing an implied false certification theory on the
basis that it seemed unreasonable that an institution—in this
case, an educational institution under Department of Education
regulations—would be required on an ongoing basis to comply
with thousands of pages of federal statutes and regulations for
the purpose of assessing liability under the FCA.81
In the midst of this circuit split, the question of the
viability of an implied false certification claim and how one
would analyze it under the FCA was further complicated when
Congress enacted amendments to the FCA in 2009 under the
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA).82 Section
3729(b)(4) resolved a separate circuit split regarding the proper
77 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d
295, 309-10 (3d Cir. 2011); United States ex. rel. Chesbrough v. VPA, P.C., 655 F.3d 461,
468 (6th Cir. 2011).
78 United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Medical, Inc., 647 F.3d 377,
387–88 (1st Cir. 2011).
79 Id. at 388.
80 United States v. TDC Mgmt. Corp., 288 F.3d 421, 426 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
81 United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 788 F.3d 696, 711–12 (7th Cir. 2015).
82 Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617
(codified as amended in various sections in Titles 18 and 31 of the United States Code).
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definition of materiality under the FCA by adopting a formal
statutory definition that reads: “having a natural tendency to
influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of
money or property.”83 The DOJ and courts have treated such
definition as a relatively low bar for materiality.84 Although two
circuits had adopted the position that the plaintiff must prove
materiality in order to sustain an implied false certification
claim, the changes to FERA did not necessarily affect or impact
the ongoing circuit split regarding the viability or application of
implied false certification claims.85 This was due to the fact that
it was not obvious after the change to “materiality” under FERA
whether the new definition actually applied to implied false
certification claims.86 Specifically, the word “material” does not
actually appear in Section 3729(a)(1)(A), which is the statute
under which implied false certification claims are typically
brought.87 Rather, the word “material” appears in Section
3729(a)(1)(B), addressing fraud by a party causing another party
to submit a claim88 and Section 3729(a)(1)(G), addressing socalled reverse false claims in which a party knowingly retains
money to which it was not entitled.89 Thus, for those courts that
83 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4) (2012). FERA was enacted primarily for the purposes
of addressing perceived accountability lapses that led to the economic collapse of 2008,
but included in its provisions “important clarifications to current criminal and civil fraud
statutes to ensure that law enforcement has the tools it needs to prevent and punish
these frauds, as well as to recover taxpayer money lost to these frauds.” S. Rep. No. 11110, at 1–2 (2009) https://www.congress.gov/111/crpt/srpt10/CRPT-111srpt10.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Z23Z-T9WW]. Prior to enactment of FERA, there was no definition of
“material” under the statute and thus there was a split among the circuits about what
“material” meant for purposes of claims under the FCA. Under FERA, Congress
ultimately adopted the definition utilized by the Seventh Circuit in United States v.
Rogan. United States v. Rogan, 517 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Kungys v.
United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988)) (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16
(1999)). This was contrary to some other circuits that proposed a stricter “outcome
materiality” definition; that is, “a falsehood or misrepresentation must affect the
government’s ultimate decision whether to remit funds to the claimant in order to be
‘material.’” United States v. Southland Mgmt. Corp., 288 F.3d 665, 676 (5th Cir. 2002), reh’g
en banc granted by United States v. Southland Mgmt. Corp., 307 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2002).
84 See Joan H. Krause, Holes in the Triple Canopy: What the Fourth Circuit
Got Wrong, 68 S. C. L. REV. 845, 851 (2017) (“While FERA’s ‘natural tendency’ test did
not specifically address the debate, many courts nonetheless interpreted the legislation
as adopting the lower ‘claim materiality’ threshold.”).
85 Id.
86 Id. at 850–51.
87 Id.
88 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (any person who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes
to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim”).
89 Id. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (any person who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be
made or used, a false record or statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit
money or property to the Government, or knowingly conceals or knowingly and
improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the
Government”). A good example of a “reverse false claim” that might be actionable under
Section 3729(a)(1)(G) is when a hospital becomes aware that it has violated the
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had adopted the position that implied false certification claims
should simply be limited by the existing materiality standard,
the new statutory definition provided some further confusion
about whether such standard would thus apply to implied false
certification claims.90
II.

THE ESCOBAR OPINION AND ITS AFTERMATH

A.

The Escobar Opinion

It was with this backdrop that the case of Universal
Health Services v. United States ex rel. Escobar made its way to
the Supreme Court.91 Amid confusion about whether the theory
of implied false certification was even valid, and, if so, how one
assesses whether liability should attach to the underlying law,
statute, or regulation on which the claim is premised, the
Supreme Court opted to review and decide a case involving an
analysis of state Medicaid regulations.92 Escobar involved
allegations against a Massachusetts mental health clinic owned
and operated by Universal Health Services that had treated a
teen-aged girl, a Massachusetts Medicaid beneficiary, for mental
health issues over the period of five years.93 After seeing several
different providers at the clinic, the girl, Yarushka Rivera, was
diagnosed with bipolar disorder and was later prescribed
treatment medication by an individual at the clinic claiming to
be a doctor.94 Unfortunately, Ms. Rivera had an adverse reaction
to the medication, causing seizures and her eventual death.95
After Rivera’s death, the family was notified that only one of the
Antikickback Statute. Under applicable regulations, the provider has sixty days from
the date of discovery to remit any monies paid to the hospital pursuant to an illegal
referral. See 42 C.F.R. § 401.305 (2017). To the extent the hospital does not remit the
payments, retaining such monies is thus considered a false claim under Section 3729(a)(1)(G).
90 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002 (“We need not decide whether § 3729(a)(1)(A)’s
materiality requirement is governed § 3729(b)(4) or derived directly from the common law.”).
91 Id. at 1989. Simultaneous to Escobar, there were three other cases that had
also petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari regarding the theory of implied false
certification. See United States ex rel. Miller v. Weston Educ., Inc., 784 F.3d 1198 (8th
Cir. 2015) (holding that defendant could be liable under the FCA because noncompliance
with Title IV is material); United States ex rel. Nelson v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 788 F.3d
696 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that the implied false certification theory is not valid under
the FCA); United States ex rel. Badr v. Triple Canopy, Inc., 775 F.3d 628 (4th Cir. 2015)
(holding that the government pleads an implied false certification claim when it alleges
facts that a request for payment is made and the requestor has knowingly withheld
information about its noncompliance with material contractual requirements in
submission of such claim).
92 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1996–97.
93 Id. at 1997.
94 Id.
95 Id.
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five providers who saw Rivera was actually properly licensed in
accordance with Massachusetts law and that the nurse who had
prescribed the medication did so without authority.96 In all,
twenty-three of the employees of the mental health clinic did not
have appropriate licenses and lacked appropriate qualifications,
all of which was in violation of applicable regulations under the
state’s Medicaid program.97
Following a complaint by Rivera’s family, the state
Medicaid agency issued a report identifying over twelve
violations of state Medicaid regulations, and Universal Health
Services subsequently agreed to a remedial plan.98 The family
then filed a lawsuit alleging that Universal Health Services’
violation of Massachusetts Medicaid regulations was an implied
false certification and thus a violation of the FCA.99 The district
court in the case dismissed the claim on the basis that while the
implied false certification theory was valid, the underlying
regulations were not conditions of payment.100 The First Circuit
reversed, however, finding that submission of a bill is an implicit
communication that it is conforming to all relevant rules and the
regulations were clearly material “because they identified
adequate supervision as an ‘express and absolute’ condition of
payment and ‘repeated[ly] reference[d]’ supervision.”101 In
granting the petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court thus
defined the purpose of its review to determine the scope and
validity of the implied false certification theory of liability.102
In Escobar, the Court established two major holdings.
First, in response to the validity of the implied false certification
theory, the Court acknowledged the viability of the theory, but
noted that such viability was not absolute.103 Relying on a backto-basics approach, the Court stated that absent a specific
96 Id. The Court noted that “the practitioner who prescribed medication to
Yarushka, and who was held out as a psychiatrist, was in fact a nurse who lacked
authority to prescribe medications absent supervision” and further observed that the
person who diagnosed Rivera with bipolar disorder represented herself as a psychologist
with a PhD, but she had obtained her degree from an online unaccredited institution and
had been rejected for licensure in the state. Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 1997–98. State Medicaid regulations require clinics such as the one at
which Rivera was treated to have certain types of providers on staff based on their
licensure classification and also require certain supervision of other staff members.
Universal Health Services was not following these rules, but was nevertheless billing for
services rendered to patients as if such rules were being followed. Id. at 1998.
100 Id.
101 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal
Health Servs., Inc., 780 F.3d 504, 514 (1st Cir. 2015)).
102 Id. at 1998–99.
103 Id. at 1999.
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definition in the statute of what might constitute “fraud,” courts
should look to those meanings established under common law
fraud claims, which have always included “misrepresentations
by omission” if such claims are materially misleading.104 Thus,
in order to distinguish between the types of claims that might be
actionable as fraud and the types of claims that would not, the
Court established the following two-part test: “first, the claim
does not merely request payment, but also makes specific
representations about the goods or services provided; and second,
the defendant’s failure . . . makes those misrepresentations
misleading half-truths.”105
In the second major holding, in response to the scope of
the implied false certification theory, the Court rejected the
position of the majority of circuits in holding that such claims
could only be maintained to the extent that the underlying law
or regulation was expressly designated as a condition of
payment.106 Rather, the Court stated, there is no statutory basis
for limiting claims only to violations of express conditions of
payment and that appropriate limitations already exist to
ensure that not every violation of any underlying statute,
regulation, or contractual provision would somehow trigger FCA
liability.107 The Court gave the following example in connection
with the limitation of scienter: “If the Government failed to specify
that guns it orders must actually shoot, but the defendant knows
that the Government routinely rescinds contracts if the guns do not
shoot, the defendant has ‘actual knowledge.’”108 Therefore, the
federal government should not necessarily be required to label a
particular rule or regulation as an express condition of payment in
order to signal to contractors what rules or regulations may be
material. Such information can be gleaned based on a showing of
the government’s past actions or communications and the
defendant’s knowledge of such communications.
Indeed, the Court reiterated this position when it provided
guidance regarding what might constitute materiality.109 Although
the FCA contains a definition of “material” in the statute,110 the
Id.
Id. at 2001.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. The Court went on to specify that scienter was an additional limitation
when it stated, “Likewise, because a reasonable person would realize the imperative of
a functioning firearm, a defendant’s failure to appreciate the materiality of that
condition would amount to ‘deliberate ignorance’ or ‘reckless disregard’ of the ‘truth or
falsity of the information’ even if the Government did not spell this out.” Id. at 2001–02.
109 Id. at 2002–04.
110 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4) (2012) (defining material as “having a natural tendency
to influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property.”).
104
105
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Court did not specifically answer the question as to whether
such definition was applicable under the implied false
certification theory.111 Rather, it stated, “We need not decide
whether the § 3729(a)(1)(A) materiality requirement is governed
by § 3729(b)(4) or derived directly from the common law.”112
Instead, the Court looked to the common law understanding of
materiality to conclude that to determine if something is material,
one “look[s] to the effect on the likely or actual behavior of the
recipient of the actual misrepresentation.”113
Using such definition, the Court provided three examples
of what might prove whether a claim is or is not material under
an FCA claim.114 The examples are all based on what the
government has communicated is material and what the
defendant knows about the government’s past payment actions.
First, the Court stated that to prove materiality one might show
that “the defendant knows that the Government consistently
refuses to pay claims in the mine run of cases based on
noncompliance with the particular statutory, regulatory or
contractual requirement.”115 Second and alternatively, for a
defendant to show that a claim is not material, one might show
that “the Government pays a particular claim in full despite its
actual knowledge that certain requirements were violated.”116
Third, a defendant could also show a clam is not material if it
shows that “the Government regularly pays a particular type of
claim in full despite actual knowledge that certain requirements
were violated, and has signaled no change in position.”117 Thus,
while an underlying statute or regulation being an express condition
of payment may be evidence of materiality, it is not dispositive.118
The Court also refused to adopt the government’s more
expansive view of materiality. That is, a violation of a statute,
regulation, or contractual provision is material if the defendant
knows that the government could withhold payment if it became
aware of such violation.119 In rejecting this more expansive view
of materiality, the Court specifically mentioned an example that

111 Implied false certification claims are typically brought under Section
3729(a)(1)(A), which provision under the FCA does not contain the word “material”
within its language. Id. § 3729(a)(1)(A).
112 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002.
113 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 26 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 69:12
(4th ed. 2003)).
114 Id. at 2003.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 2003.
117 Id. at 2003–04.
118 Id. at 2003.
119 Id. at 2004.
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had come up in oral argument—the American-made stapler.120
The Court noted that it did not think that the FCA was intended
to extend liability to a situation in which a regulation requires
contractors to purchase American-made staplers, but a
contractor subsequently fails to disclose use of foreign stapler.121
These examples and similar limitations are littered throughout the
opinion: the FCA is “not an all-purpose antifraud statute;”122 the
materiality standard set forth in the case is “demanding;”123 and the
FCA is intended to capture fraud and not medical malpractice.124
Thus, a few things are clear from the opinion. First, based
on principles of common law fraud, FCA liability can include
fraud that is related to a material misrepresentation of a
misleading half-truth, which further includes express
misrepresentations and also omissions (i.e., implied false
certifications).125 Second, when contemplating what types of
implied false certification claims should be actionable, claims
should not be limited to those premised on an express condition
of payment, but rather should extend to any misleading halftruth that is material to the government as part of the contract—
like guns that do not shoot.126 Third, materiality should be a
demanding standard based on the effect on the government’s
behavior (likely or actual) of the alleged misrepresentation.127
Accordingly, the government’s knowledge that a contractor used
a foreign-made stapler in violation of a regulation would not
result in FCA liability.128
Like many Supreme Court opinions, the Escobar opinion
answered a few questions and raised a few more. Now, nearly
two years removed from Escobar, the lower courts are grappling
with how to apply the guidelines. While some aspects of the
opinion appear to be easily applied across jurisdictions, there are
a number of other areas that are causing a great deal of
confusion and variability in terms of application of the new
materiality standard.

Id.
Id.
122 Id. at 2003 (quoting Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553
U.S. 662, 672 (2008)).
123 Id. at 1994.
124 Id. at 2004.
125 Id. at 2001.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 2002.
128 Id. at 2004.
120
121
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Reaction of the Department of Justice

Following a Supreme Court opinion, one of the biggest
drivers of how the case is interpreted is the DOJ’s position in
subsequent cases and briefs regarding how such opinion should
be viewed by lower courts.129 It could be said that the DOJ was
both a winner and a loser in the Escobar opinion. Perhaps the
most successful aspect of Escobar from the DOJ’s perspective is
the fact that the case does extend liability under the FCA to
implied false certification cases and goes so far as to include
underlying rules or regulations that could be conditions of
payment or conditions of participation.130 In contrast, however,
the Court rejected a broad materiality standard and instead
stressed that the materiality standard should be demanding and
should protect against reading Escobar as significantly
expanding liability under the FCA.131 Consequently, Escobar
seems to be the new favorite defense for entities accused of
violations of the FCA.132 The DOJ, on the other hand, seems to
be focused on trying to convince courts that Escobar actually
changes very little in terms of FCA precedent and that the
opinion simply reiterated how lower courts were always
interpreting implied false certification claims.133 Indeed, one
case noted in its opinion, “[t]he United States argues that
‘nothing in Escobar purports to overrule preexisting cases like
Wilkins that affirmed a broader view of implied certification
than the Supreme Court needed to address in Escobar.’”134
1. “Specific Misrepresentations”
There are two primary aspects of the Escobar opinion
that the DOJ has focused on in its briefs and in arguments to
the court. First, in an effort to keep the ability to bring implied
false certification claims as expansive as possible, the DOJ has
taken the position that the two-part test articulated by the
Supreme Court for what may be necessary to show when
alleging an implied false certification is simply one way to plead

129 Douglas W. Baruch & Jennifer M. Wollenberg, FCA Implied Certification
Cases—Justice Department’s Aggressive Post-Escobar Briefing Signals Its Concern Over
the Decision’s Potential Impact, 58 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 375 (2016).
130 See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2001–04.
131 See id.; see also Krause, supra note 84, at 851.
132 Baruch & Wollenberg, supra note 129.
133 Id.
134 United States ex rel. Schimpelpfenig v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, Ltd., Civil
Action No. 11-4607, 2017 WL 1133956, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2017).
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an implied false certification claim.135 Specifically, the DOJ has
seized onto the introductory phrase in the two-part test: “[W]e
hold that the implied certification theory can be a basis for
liability, at least where two conditions are satisfied.”136 In an
effort to retain the ability to bring an implied false certification
claim that does not necessarily involve a claim making a
“specific representation,” the DOJ has been arguing in some
cases that the requirements set forth in Escobar are not
exclusive.137 By way of example, the DOJ has argued in certain
pleadings: “Although Escobar affirmed the implied false
certification theory in situations where the defendant provides
some description of the goods or services that render the claim
misleading, the Court did not suggest that this is the only
circumstance when the implied false certification theory
applies.”138 At this point, most courts seem to be applying both
conditions set forth in Escobar, either without discussion of the
phrase “at least” or, instead, rejecting altogether the argument
that Escobar provides merely one circumstance for proving an
implied false certification claim.139 The DOJ position has been
135 The government has been most successful making this argument in
California because of an existing case, United States ex rel. Ebeid v. Lungwitz, in which
the Ninth Circuit held that it is not necessary for the plaintiff to provide an express
representation in order to sustain an implied false certification claim. United States ex
rel. Ebeid v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2010). Therefore, after Escobar, the DOJ
and relators’ counsel have all been arguing that the two-part test articulated in Escobar
does not overrule Ebeid, but rather specifies another means by which an implied false
certification case can be proven. See United States’ Statement of Interest Regarding
Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar at 5, United States ex rel.
Mateski v. Raytheon Co., No. 2:CV06-3614ODW(FMOx) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2016), ECF
No. 163 [hereinafter United States’ Statement of Interest] (“[T]he United States urges
the Court to find that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Ebeid remains good law, and that
claims for payment by a contractor impliedly certify that the contractor has complied
with all material terms of its contract.”).
136 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2001 (emphasis added).
137 Baruch & Wollenberg, supra note 129 (citing United States’ Statement of
Interest, supra note 135, at 1–2).
138 Id.
139 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Kelly v. Serco, Inc., 846 F.3d 325, 332 (9th Cir.
2017) (affirming the grant of summary judgment for the defendant on the basis that
there was no “specific representation” about Serco’s performance made by its submission
of public vouchers to the Department of Defense); United States ex rel. Sheet Metal
Workers Int’l Ass’n v. Horning Investments, LLC, 828 F.3d 587, 592–93 (7th Cir. 2016)
(applying the test while omitting the “at least in certain circumstance” caveat); United
States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 840 F.3d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 2016) (applying the test as if
the conditions must be met); United States ex rel. Schimelpfenig, Civil Action No. 114607, 2017 WL 1133956, at *5–6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2017) (holding that despite the
arguments from the government on this issue, the Third Circuit already adopted
Escobar’s requirements regarding specific representations in the case of United States
ex rel. Whatley v. Eastwick College, 657 Fed. App’x 89, 94 (3d Cir. 2016)); but see United
States ex rel. Badr v. Triple Canopy, Inc., 857 F.3d 174, 178 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that
“specific representation” requirement related to falsity of the claim and that an invoice
that simply lists the number of guards and hours worked could be considered false
because of its omissions).
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successfully adopted by a few district courts,140 however, and the
specific question as to whether presentation of the two
conditions are required in each implied false certification theory
has been certified as a question to the Ninth Circuit.141
While this appears to be a significant issue for the DOJ
relative to the FCA generally, it is not entirely clear that it will
actually be a significant issue in cases involving health care
companies. Many of the courts that have addressed this issue
have compared the “specific representations” in Escobar—which
contains specific codes regarding the types of services that were
provided and corresponding regulations about the types of
licensed providers who were supposed to provide the service—to
rather vague representations such as invoices or reports.142
Unlike some situations involving the Department of Defense or
the Department of Education, which often involve submission of
reports or submission of simple invoices, health care claims seem
to automatically involve a “specific representation” based on the
140 As noted above, the DOJ has been most successful in making this argument
in California because of existing case law that held that it was not necessary for a claim
to make specific representations to be actionable under the FCA. See Ebeid, 616 F.3d at
995; see also supra note 135 and accompanying text. For examples of cases in which this
has been an issue, see United States v. Celgene Corp., 226 F. Supp. 3d 1032, 1044–45
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2016) (“Celgene argues that Brown cannot proceed on an implied
certification theory because she cannot satisfy the two conditions mentioned in Escobar.
Celgene misreads that decision. The Court explicitly declined to ‘resolve whether all
claims for payment implicitly represent that the billing system is legally entitled to
payment.’ Nor were the two conditions intended to describe the outer reaches of FCA
liability: the Court stated that liability could be found ‘at least’ where these conditions
were satisfied.” (citation omitted) (quoting Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United
States, 136 S. Ct. 2001 (2016))); United States ex rel. McBride v. Halliburton Co., 848
F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 2017); United States v. DynCorp Int’l, LLC, 253 F. Supp. 3d
89, 99–100 (D.D.C. 2017); United States ex rel. Landis v. Tailwind Sports Co., 234 F.
Supp. 3d 180 (D.D.C. 2017); but see United States ex rel. Mateski v. Raytheon Co., Case
No. 2:06-cv-03614-ODW(KSx), 2017 WL 1954942, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2017)
(“Raytheon argues that Escobar limits the implied false certification theory to instances
where the claim for payment contains specific representations regarding the goods or
service rendered, as opposed to merely requesting payment. Mateski and the
Government respond that Escobar’s holding is not so broad, and that the Supreme Court
expressly withheld judgment on whether an implied false certification theory of liability
could encompass claims that simply request payment—thus leaving intact the Ninth
Circuit’s prior case law on that specific issue. After briefing on this Motion was complete,
the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in United States ex rel. Kelly v. Serco, Inc. which
applied Escobar to an FCA claim under an implied false certification theory. The Court
concludes that Escobar, as interpreted by Kelly, requires that the claim contain specific
representations to be actionable.” (internal citation omitted)).
141 Rose v. Stephens Inst., No. 09-CV-05966-PJH, 2016 WL 6393513, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 28, 2016). The district court certified the following question to the Ninth
Circuit, “whether Escobar’s ‘two conditions’ are necessary conditions for liability.” The
court also certified three other questions to the Ninth Circuit with this question. As of
April 13, 2018, the Ninth Circuit has not issued an opinion in this case.
142 Badr, 857 F.3d at 178 (noting that representations were invoices); Kelly, 846
F.3d at 332 (noting that the reports contained no “specific representations” as was the
case in claims submitted in Escobar).
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fact that each claim will include information regarding the
service that was claimed to be rendered and applicable
regulations typically tied to how the service is rendered.143 Even
FCA allegations that might stem from the filing of cost reports
would likely be interpreted to contain a distinct representation
regarding specific costs that were reported to the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) based on the
understanding of the regulations regarding what costs are and
are not reimbursed.144 Thus, while this may be an issue in
connection with FCA claims involving Department of Defense or
Department of Education, it seems most health care claims will
already meet the test set forth in Escobar. Given that, even if a
majority of courts adopt the position that the two-part test set
forth in Escobar is not exclusive, it is unlikely to affect the ability
to bring health care claims because they appear to meet both the
Escobar test and any other less exacting test that could be
applied in the courts.
2. Existing “Materiality” Definition
The second issue that the DOJ has focused on in
subsequent briefs and oral arguments relates to how the
materiality inquiry that the Court articulated in Escobar relates
to the definition of “material” in the statute and whether the
directive that the standard be “demanding” changes how a court
should assess materiality.145 Consistent with its position
generally on the impact of Escobar on existing FCA enforcement,
the DOJ is largely taking the position that the opinion does not
indicate a change to the manner in which courts have been
assessing materiality; that is, “materiality” under the FCA
should be assessed based on whether the fraud (or in the case of
implied false certification, the noncompliance) has a “natural
tendency to influence” the government in its payment decision.146
143 DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., FACT SHEET MEDICARE BILLING: 837P AND FORM CMS-1500, MEDICARE
LEARNING NETWORK 2 (n.d.), https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/MedicareLearning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/downloads/form_cms-1500_fact_sheet.pdf [http://
perma.cc/K7NS-XBFH] (describing how claims should be coded and the level of detail
required when submitting a claim for a particular service).
144 See generally Cost Reports, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://
www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/downloadable-public-use-files/costreports/ [http://perma.cc/JJ99-TQYT].
145 Baruch & Wollenberg, supra note 129.
146 See United States ex rel. Johnson v. Golden Gate Nat’l Senior Care, L.L.C.,
223 F. Supp. 3d 882, 891 (D. Minn. 2016) (holding that the requirement of materiality
as defined by Section 3729(b)(4) of the FCA must be met to maintain a claim under
Section 3729(a)(1)(A) or 3729(a)(1)(B) and the materiality factors set forth in Escobar are
to be used as a guide). As noted above, the “natural tendency to influence” standard
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Although the Court in Escobar specifically declined to opine as
to whether that specific statutory definition of material applied
to implied false certification cases, the DOJ is taking the position
that the standard applied in Escobar is not a heightened
standard beyond the usual standard of a “natural tendency.”147
Thus, the DOJ argues the Escobar materiality inquiry is simply
for the purpose of determining whether the omission or
misrepresentation has the natural tendency to influence.
While lower courts do universally seem to be embracing
the assertion set forth in Escobar that the materiality standard
should be demanding,148 courts have expressed some confusion
and have taken varied approaches regarding whether Escobar’s
clarification on how to assess materiality in implied false
certification cases is a new standard or should be assessed
somehow in conjunction with an historical standard.149 For
example, some courts have taken the position that the standard
set forth in Escobar has little distinction from the “natural
tendency” standard:
In analyzing materiality, we noted that a material falsehood was one
that was capable of influencing the Government’s decision to pay. We
explained that the standard was a high one intended to keep FCA
liability from attaching to “noncompliance with any of potentially
hundreds of legal requirements” in a contract. Applying the standard,
we found Triple Canopy’s omissions material for two reasons: common
arises out of the definition of “material” under Section 3729(b)(4) of the FCA that was
enacted as part of FERA, which itself was adopted based on long-standing application of
that definition under applicable case law. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.
The definition that was adopted under FERA arose out of case law, as courts for years
had viewed the materiality standard as one simply being capable or having a natural
tendency to influence and not requiring a showing that such influence was successful.
See United States v. Rogan, 517 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Instead [Rogan] argues
that the omissions were not material. By this he does not mean the usual definition,
under which a ‘statement is material if it has “a natural tendency to influence, or [is]
capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was
addressed.”’” (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999))).
147 See Supplemental Brief for the United States at 12, United States ex rel.
Badr v. Triple Canopy, Inc., 857 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2017) (Nos. 13-2190(L), 13-2191),
2016 WL 4425869 (“[T]he Supreme Court did not impose a heightened test for
materiality beyond the ‘natural tendency’ test codified in the False Claims Act.”).
148 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech, Inc., 855 F.3d 481, 489–
91 (3d Cir. 2017) (“The Court described [the Escobar standard] as ‘demanding’ and
‘rigorous’ and explained that a material misrepresentation is one that goes ‘to the very
essence of the bargain.’” (quoting United States ex rel Escobar, 139 S. Ct. 1989, 2002–2003,
2003 n.5 (2016))); see also United States ex rel. Kelly v. Serco, Inc., 846 F.3d 325, 331 (9th
Cir. 2017); United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 840 F.3d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 2016).
149 See Petratos, 855 F.3d at 489; Johnson, 223 F. Supp. 3d at 891–92; United
States v. Celgene Corp., 226 F. Supp. 3d 1032, 1044–45 (C.D. Cal. 2016); see also United
States ex rel. Worthy v. Eastern Maine Healthcare Systems, 2:14-cv-00184-JAW, 2017
WL 211609, at *26 (D. Me. Jan. 18, 2017); United States ex rel. Thayer v. Planned
Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc., No. 4:11-cv-00129-JAJ-CFB, 2016 WL 7474797, *5–6
(S.D. Iowa June 21, 2016).
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sense and Triple Canopy’s own actions in covering up the
noncompliance. That conclusion perfectly aligns with [Escobar].150

Some other courts have analyzed materiality under both the
definitional standard and independently under the Escobar
standard. In the case of United States ex rel. Petratos v.
Genentech, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit identified that the FCA defines materiality as “having a
natural tendency to influence” and described the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Escobar as providing “guidance as to how the
materiality requirement should be enforced.”151 The court goes
on to seemingly analyze the “guidance” potentially as its own
test—separate and apart from the statutory definition—to state
that the “Supreme Court’s guidance . . . also militates against a
finding of materiality.”152 Many courts seem to be taking an
approach similar to that of the Third Circuit, viewing the
standard set forth in Escobar as the factors necessary for the
purpose of meeting the statutory definition under the FCA.153
Two observations arise in connection with this particular
issue. First, the Escobar Court’s decision not to address the
relationship between the statutory definition of “material” found
in Section 3729(b)(4) and the guidance it set forth regarding how
to assess materiality has caused confusion among the lower
courts about how to square these two standards. Despite the
Court’s clear choice not to utilize the statutory definition in
Escobar, many courts seem compelled by either precedent or
statutory interpretation to utilize the definition as part of any
analysis.154 It would seem then, that the DOJ is realizing some
success as it relates to its argument that Escobar has not really
altered the broadly-applied natural tendency standard. It does
appear, however, that while courts may be applying the
statutory definition, they are simultaneously endorsing the idea
that Escobar firmly establishes that the materiality standard for
FCA cases is intended to be demanding and rigorous.155
Consequently, when courts continue to utilize the statutory
definition, the manner in which such courts are considering
whether an omission or misrepresentation has a natural
tendency to influence or is capable of influencing the decision
maker is analyzed through a more rigorous and exacting lens.
150 Badr, 857 F.3d at 178 (quoting United States ex rel. Badr v. Triple Canopy,
775 F.3d 628, 637 (4th Cir. 2015), vacated and remanded by 136 S. Ct. 2504 (2016)).
151 Petratos, 855 F.3d at 489.
152 Id. at 490 (emphasis added).
153 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
154 See supra notes 149–152.
155 See supra note 140.

1256

III.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:4

FINDING PROOF OF MATERIALITY

Predictably, one of the most closely watched aspects of
the Escobar opinion is how lower court cases interpret the
guidelines for materiality and the type of proof that may be
necessary (or is not sufficient) to meet this demanding standard.
While the Court has instructed that selling the government guns
that do not shoot despite no express regulation indicating such
would be material and using foreign-made staplers
notwithstanding a law requiring use of American-made staplers
would not be material, the opinion itself does not provide
examples for what might fall in between these two extremes.156
In this middle area lies the Court’s direction regarding
regulations that are expressly conditions of payment. The Court
made clear that a regulation that is expressly a condition of
payment is relevant to materiality, although not dispositive.157
In order to reconcile the previously common analysis regarding
whether a regulation was a condition of payment with the new
position under Escobar,158 some lower courts have dedicated a
great deal of analysis to whether a regulation is an express
condition of payment and how that conclusion might affect the
materiality analysis.159 While lower courts have continued to
analyze whether a regulation is an express condition of payment,
how courts have utilized their conclusion on this issue for
purposes of assessing materiality has varied, with some using it
as evidence of materiality and others utilizing it to hold that
Escobar made clear this finding alone does not establish
materiality.160 Although this seems to have made it more difficult
to determine prior to the filing of any FCA claim whether a
particular regulation is or is not material, the outcome certainly
seems to be in furtherance of the Supreme Court’s intention that
lower courts look more at whether the fraud is the type that
would rise to the level of common law fraud.

156 Universal Health Servs, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct.
1989, 2001–04 (2016).
157 Id. at 2001.
158 Many of the cases analyzing the Escobar opinion have done so on a remand
from a higher court because the lower court holding was based on a finding that the
implied certification theory did or did not apply based on the fact that the regulation was
or was not an express condition of payment. See, e.g., Badr, 857 F.3d at 177–78; United
States ex rel. Miller v. Weston Educ., Inc., 840 F.3d 494, 503–04 (8th Cir. 2016).
159 Miller, 840 F.3d at 504.
160 See Badr, 857 F.3d at 177–78; cf. United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech,
Inc., 855 F.3d 481, 489–90 (3d Cir. 2017).
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Treatment of Conditions of Payment

In United States v. Triple Canopy, Inc.—a case that the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit remanded
back to the lower court on the same day that the Supreme Court
released its Escobar opinion—the specific regulation upon which
the claim was premised was not an express condition of
payment.161 Based on Escobar, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed its
previous conclusion that, absent an express condition of
payment, materiality could be proven based on “common sense”
and Triple Canopy’s own actions to conceal any
noncompliance.162 In support of its assertion that its previous
holding was consistent with the materiality standard in
Escobar, the court stated that “Guns that do not shoot are as
material to the Government’s decision to pay as guards that
cannot shoot straight.”163 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit held in
United States ex rel. Miller v. Weston Educational, Inc. that
although falsifying grade records and attendance records was
not expressly a condition of payment, the misrepresentation was
clearly material because recordkeeping itself was a
precondition—in three different ways—for participation in the
government program and thus payment under the program.164
In contrast, the Third Circuit analyzed a regulation that
was expressly a condition of payment, but relied on Escobar’s
holding that such finding was not dispositive to find that the
plaintiff failed to plead that CMS consistently refused to pay the
type of claims set forth in the complaint.165 Rather, the plaintiff
conceded that such claims were consistently reimbursed.166 The
plaintiff had argued that whether a claim is material should not
focus on the government’s decision to pay, but instead should
look to whether the false statements were material to those
submitting the claims—the providers in this instance.167 In
support of this position, the plaintiff cited to the following line
in Escobar: “materiality ‘look[s] to the effect on the likely or
actual behavior of the recipient of the alleged misrepresentation.’”168
Badr, 857 F.3d at 179.
Id. at 178.
163 Id. at 179.
164 Miller, 840 F.3d at 504.
165 Petratos, 855 F.3d at 485.
166 Id. at 485–86 (involving claims against a pharmaceutical company that it
was causing providers to make claims for the drug Avastin that were not “reasonable
and necessary”).
167 Id. at 490–91.
168 Id. at 491 (alteration in original) (quoting Universal Health Servs., Inc. v.
United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2002 (2016)).
161
162

1258

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:4

The court specifically rejected this idea, however, stating that
such reference in the context of the Escobar opinion was
referring to fraud against the federal government (not fraud
against a third party who then bills the federal government),
which the Third Circuit claimed was most consistent with other
holdings.169 Similar to the Third Circuit, the Ninth Circuit also
analyzed a regulation that was determined to be a condition of
payment.170 Despite this finding, the court nevertheless
dismissed the claim on the basis that, among other things, the
government’s behavior in the past reflected the fact that it did
not view the allegedly falsified reports as helpful or necessary
for purposes of payment.171 In both instances, the court found
that the fact that the regulation was an express condition of
payment was irrelevant due to the evidence presented that the
federal government had consistently paid similar types of claims
in the past despite awareness of fraudulent activity.172
As the cases above demonstrate, while conditions of
payment and how such finding affects materiality remains a
common issue, it seems that the thrust of the Escobar opinion—
and thus the primary emphasis with lower courts—is the newly
established focus on the government’s behavior and the
defendant’s knowledge of such behavior.173 Moreover, these cases
seem to also indicate a shift away from the statutory “natural
tendency” standard, which would only require proof that the
misrepresentation would have a tendency to affect the
government’s decision to pay, toward a materiality standard
that requires evidence that the government was in fact
influenced—it knew of the noncompliance and chose to pay the
claim regardless.174
Because the Supreme Court provided guidance regarding
both what might be necessary to substantiate materiality and
what might negate materiality, some courts have used evidence
to prove a claim is material and some have used evidence to
prove a claim is not material. For example, in Abbott v. BP
Exploration & Production, Inc., the Fifth Circuit dismissed the
FCA claim on the basis that the government was aware of BP
Exploration & Production, Inc.’s actions and chose not to
169 Id. at 491–92 (citing United States ex rel. Garzione v. PAE Gov’t Servs., Inc.,
670 Fed. App’x 126, 127 (4th Cir. 2016)); see United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 840
F.3d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 2016).
170 See United States ex rel. Kelly v. Serco, Inc., 846 F.3d 325, 332 (9th Cir. 2017).
171 See id. at 334.
172 See generally Kelly, 846 F.3d 325; Petratos, 855 F.3d 481.
173 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002–03.
174 See, e.g., Kelly, 846 F.3d at 334.
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suspend operations or to revoke the contract. This government
inaction thus showed that the government did not find BP
Exploration & Production, Inc.’s noncompliance material.175
Quoting Escobar’s directive that “courts need not opine in the
abstract when the record offers insight into the Government’s
actual payment decisions,” the District of Columbia Circuit has
found similarly that a claim did not establish materiality
because it was not clear that the government actually used the
alleged fraudulent data for purposes of payment.176 Likewise, an
allegation of a regulation as a condition precedent to payment
was insufficient for proving materiality absent additional
evidence that the government found this material through its
payment actions.177 In contrast, evidence used to show
materiality—as opposed to a showing that a regulation was not
material—has included language in the regulations and
testimony from regulators themselves about whether or not such
regulations are material to the government’s payment decision178
or a lack of knowledge on the part of the government during the
time that claims were paid.179
B.

The Impact of “Timing”

While the Supreme Court in Escobar provided guidelines
about types of evidence that would prove materiality, it provided
little information regarding when such behavior might occur,

175 Abbot v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 851 F.3d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 2017). The case
involved allegations that BP had inadequate documentation and further documentation
that was not appropriately approved by engineers in connection with the building of an
oil production platform. U.S. Congress conducted an investigation into the matter, as did
the Department of Interior. The Department of Interior concluded in a report in 2011
that the allegations were without merit. Id. at 386.
176 United States ex rel. McBride v. Halliburton Co., 848 F.3d 1027, 1032 (D.C.
Cir. 2017) (citing Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002).
177 See United States ex rel. Scharff v. Camelot Counseling, No. 13-cv-3791 (PKC),
2016 WL 5416494, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2016) (finding that the plaintiff had failed to
plead materiality in connection with alleged violations of mental health regulations due to
failure to keep adequate notes, incorrectly billing time spent with patients, and
maintenance of records that contained patient signatures).
178 See United States v. Dynamic Visions, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 3d 1, 16 (D.D.C.
2016) (“Finally, Plaintiff provides the declaration of the Medicaid Director of the District
of Columbia Medicaid Program that states that DHCF does not, in fact, reimburse
providers for services provided where there is no plan of care, where the plan of care has
not been signed by a physician or advanced practice nurse, where the plan of care has
been signed but only after services had been rendered, or where a signed plan of care
exists but the services billed exceed the scope of that plan.”).
179 See United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 842 F.3d
103, 111–12 (1st Cir. 2016) (holding on remand that the claims were material even
though there was evidence that the government continued to pay the claims because it
was during a time of a lack of government knowledge).
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either before or after the fraud has been alleged.180 For example,
in Triple Canopy, Inc., in addition to the Fourth Circuit’s finding
that materiality was simply “common sense,” the court found
that the defendant’s own behavior substantiated materiality.181
Specifically, the court found that the defendant’s attempt to
conceal that many of its guards did not possess the necessary
certification as marksman pursuant to the contract was clearly
representative of the fact that the defendants knew that the
government would not pay the claims if it knew the guards did
not have such qualifications.182 In other words, the defendant
would never have felt compelled to make the fraudulent
representations unless the defendant suspected that the
government would not pay the claims if it knew.183 The court also
cited to the government’s behavior as evidence, noting that when
the government became aware that it was possible that Triple
Canopy’s guards did not meet necessary qualifications, the
federal government did not renew the contract with the company
and also immediately intervened in the FCA case after the
whistleblower filed the claim.184 In this case, the court used
prospective knowledge of the defendant and retrospective
behavior of the government to show materiality.
A similar example of when a court looked to the
retrospective behavior of the government for purposes of proving
materiality is the First Circuit’s analysis on remand of the
Escobar case.185 Universal Health Services argued that the state
Medicaid program was aware of the company’s violations
because the plaintiffs, prior to filing the FCA case, had actually
filed a complaint with the state Medicaid program and the
Medicaid program continued to pay claims despite being made
aware of the allegations by the family.186 The First Circuit
rejected this reasoning, however, on the basis that “mere
awareness of allegations concerning noncompliance with
180 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Badr v. Triple Canopy, Inc., 857 F.3d 174, 179
(4th Cir. 2017) (utilizing the fact that the DOJ intervened on the FCA case after it was
filed as proof of materiality); United States ex rel. Kelly v. Serco, Inc., 846 F.3d 325, 337
(9th Cir. 2017) (holding that although the federal government had noted a particular
recordkeeping requirement as a condition of payment prior to the filing, this was
nevertheless not dispositive of a finding of materiality because the government did not
rely on the reports for purpose of payment); Escobar, 842 F.3d at 112 (holding that
although the state of New York was arguably aware of the fraud after investigation of the
provider following a complaint, the fact that the state continued to pay the claim despite
this knowledge was not determinative of a finding that the claims were not material).
181 Badr, 857 F.3d at 176–78.
182 Id. at 176.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 179.
185 See Escobar, 842 F.3d at 105.
186 Id. at 111–12.
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regulations is different from knowledge of actual
noncompliance” and there was no evidence of actual knowledge
by the government such that it would negate a finding of
materiality.187 The court does not opine as to whether its finding
of materiality would be negated if the government continued to
pay the claims despite actual knowledge, but the opinion does
seem to suggest that to the extent that one intends to prove a
claim is not material, actual knowledge of noncompliance would
be a necessary prerequisite.188
Most of the cases analyzing materiality based on the
government’s knowledge of the noncompliance have relied on
evidence regarding the government’s knowledge and action or
inaction prior to the filing of the FCA claim, and few at this point
have identified the scheme itself as indicative of materiality.189
Thus, while it appears that most courts are examining past
behavior, the possibility that evidence of behavior retrospective
to the filing of an FCA claim or, indeed the alleged fraud itself,
does have the potential for confusion and challenges. Distinct
from an express condition of payment, which would have put a
government contractor on notice as to whether violation of such
regulation would be subject to liability under the FCA, the new
materiality standard requires a case-by-case analysis as to the
government’s knowledge of each action and the defendant’s
awareness of the government’s knowledge. While the
materiality standard might more closely resemble claims
asserting common law fraud, it provides potentially less clarity
to contractors regarding the types of behavior that may or may
not be actionable under the FCA and what interactions with
government regulators might mean for future FCA liability.

187 Id. at 112 (“[T]here is no evidence in the complaint that MassHealth, the
entity paying Medicaid claims, had actual knowledge of any of these allegations (much
less their veracity) as it paid UCH’s claims.”).
188 Id. (“Because we find no evidence that MassHealth had actual knowledge of
the violations at the time it paid the claims at issue, we need not decide whether actual
knowledge of the violations would in fact be sufficiently strong evidence that the
violations were not material to the government’s payment decision so as to support a
motion to dismiss in this case.”).
189 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech Inc., 855 F.3d 481, 492
(3d Cir. 2017); United States ex rel. Campie v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 862 F.3d 890, 905–06
(9th Cir. 2017) (holding that, while the FDA was at least aware of the noncompliance
because of a warning letter and an inspection and noncompliance letter and the
government continued to pay claims, FDA’s failure to withdraw approval of the drug
does not suffice to provide the claims were material for purposes of FCA); A1
Procurement, LLC v. Thermcor, Inc., No. 2:15cv15, 2017 WL 2881350, at *6 (E.D. Va.
July 5, 2017). But see Badr, 857 F.3d at 178.
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ARGUMENT: THE IMPACT OF ESCOBAR ON HEALTH CARE
COMPANIES

As courts of appeals and district courts wade through
allegations against contractors with the Department of Defense,
Department of Education, and Department of Health and
Human Services under the FCA,190 the Escobar opinion has
provided helpful guidance by affirming the validity of implied
false certification claims and by emphasizing that the materiality
standard under the FCA is demanding and rigorous and thus
should be applied strictly.191 Like many Supreme Court opinions,
however, it has also raised a number of questions and issues,
resulting in inconsistent application of different aspects of implied
false certification claims. The DOJ seems to be doing its best to
argue that Escobar has changed little to nothing about the legal
analysis for implied false certification claims.192 While this has
had at least some success,193 it does seem that most courts view
Escobar not simply as affirmation to permit implied false
certification claims, but a directive to apply a stricter and more
precise application of implied false certification claims.194 As
such, most courts appear to be at least considering Escobar to
require analyzing regulations and materiality with a different lens.
It should be noted, however, that while many courts
appear to be giving credence to this more demanding standard,
it is not entirely clear whether these same cases would have
come out differently had Escobar instead adopted the position of
the majority of circuits permitting implied false certification
claims to proceed only in connection with regulations expressly
designated as conditions of payment. While a few courts have in
fact permitted claims to proceed that are seemingly based on

190 See Justice Dep’t Recovers Over $3.7 Billion, supra note 7 (noting that FCA
recoveries arise out of the health care industry, but also from “defense and national
security, food safety and inspection, federally insured loans and mortgages, highway funds,
small business contracts, agricultural subsidies, disaster assistance, and import tariffs”).
191 See, e.g., Petratos, 855 F.3d at 489; A1 Procurement, LLC, 2017 WL 2881350
at *3; United States ex rel. Lee v. N. Adult Daily Health Care Ctr., 205 F. Supp. 3d 276,
295 (E.D.N.Y. 2016); United States ex rel. Brown v. Celgene Co., 226 F. Supp. 3d 1032,
1049 (C.D. Cal. 2016).
192 Baruch & Wollenberg, supra note 129.
193 See discussion supra note 140.
194 In perhaps one of the most notable examples of this application to date, a
district judge in Florida negated a $350 million judgment against a nursing home operator
for alleged violations of the FCA on the basis that “[t]he defendants argue persuasively that
the relator failed to offer evidence of materiality, defined unambiguously and required
emphatically by Universal Health Services, Inc. v. Escobar.” See Jeff Overley, Escobar
Erases Nursing Co.’s $350M FCA Verdict, LAW360 (Jan. 11, 2018, 6:27 PM), https://
www.law360.com/articles/1001439 [https://perma.cc/38RG-NYPN].
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violations of conditions of participation,195 the large bulk of FCA
claims that actually proceed to court—in lieu of settlement—are
typically dismissed on a motion for summary judgment.196
Further, in the bulk of these cases, the government has reviewed
the case and chosen not to intervene, and thus the relator is
proceeding on his/her own.197 While intervention in a case should
not be used in all instances as a marker for the viability of the
case itself, there are many cases in which the government
declines to intervene or proceed to settlement because the claim
does not have sufficient merit to be successfully argued in
court.198 Thus, given that the vast majority of the examples of the
application of Escobar are in cases making their way through
the court system—and thus have been unsealed due to the
government’s declination to intervene—it is challenging to
understand and fully comprehend the impact that Escobar and
the new materiality standard actually has on FCA claims. The
bulk of legal analysis and interpretation of Escobar has thus far
and will continue to arise out of claims that may have been
flawed or legally unsustainable for entirely other reasons. Given
that, it is somewhat dubious or dangerous to claim that Escobar
has entirely changed the legal landscape such that the new
exacting standard is dismissing vastly more claims than would be
dismissed prior to Escobar. Courts seem to be aware that Escobar
stands for the notion that implied false certification claims must
195 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Johnson v. Golden Gate Nat’l Senior Care,
L.L.C., 223 F. Supp. 3d 882, 894 (D. Minn. 2016).
196 In a review of cases from the federal courts of appeals in the twelve months
following the Escobar opinion that cited to Escobar in some manner in their opinion,
there were only six cases of the thirty-two that did not affirm the district court opinion
and, of those twenty-nine cases, nearly all affirmed the dismissal of the FCA claim in the
district court. Note that while the vast majority of these cases were FCA cases, at least
a few were related to another law, but utilized Escobar for purposes of analyzing
materiality. See, e.g., In re Vivendi, S.A. Securities Litigation, 838 F.3d 223 (2d. Cir.
2016) (citing to Escobar to support the legal premise that “half-truths . . . can be
actionable misrepresentations” (quoting Universal Health Servs. v. United States ex rel
Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2000 & n.3 (2016))). Many of the cases involved dismissal of
the claim for failure to plead with particularity or failure to state a claim and were not
actually dismissed based on either failure to please a specific representation in an
implied false certification claim or meet the new materiality standard. See, e.g., United
States ex rel. McGrath v. Microsemi Corp., 690 Fed. App’x 551, 552 (9th Cir. 2017)
(affirmed dismissal under Rules 8(a) and 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure);
Olson v. Fairview Health Servs. of Minnesota, 831 F.3d 1063, 1066 (8th Cir. 2016)
(affirmed dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); United
States & Wisconsin ex rel. Presser v. Acacia Mental Health Clinic, LLC, 836 F.3d 770,
772–73 (7th Cir. 2016) (affirmed dismissal of the bulk of claims for failure to state a claim
under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
197 See FRAUD STATISTICS, supra note 43, at 1.
198 David Freeman Engstrom, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement:
Empirical Analysis of DOJ Oversight of Qui Tam Litigation under the False Claims Act,
107 NW. U. L. REV. 1689, 1693–94 (2013).
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be viewed rigorously, but this does not appear to be the sole or
singular reason that courts are dismissing FCA claims.199
It is possible that there could be some clarity on this
front, given the DOJ’s current position regarding how
department prosecutors should address FCA claims in which the
DOJ has chosen not to intervene.200 In an internal memorandum
dated January 10, 2018, Director Michael D. Granston noted to
attorneys in the Commercial Litigation Branch, Fraud Section
that while the number of qui tam cases has increased greatly
over the last few years, the DOJ’s intervention rate has
“remained relatively static.”201 Because the government still
expends a substantial amount of money to monitor and
participate in non-intervened cases, Director Granston
instructed prosecutors to consider whether to seek a dismissal of
claims that the prosecutors believe lack substantial merit.202
While Granston stated that dismissal should be used “only
where truly warranted,” the memorandum is a directive to
prosecutors to be more proactive regarding not just declining to
intervene in meritless cases, but actively working towards
curbing meritless claims.203 Thus, while this directive will not
eliminate all non-intervened cases, there should be perhaps
fewer meritless claims applying the Escobar analysis. This may
in turn provide a more accurate assessment of how stringently
Escobar will be applied to meritorious claims.
A.

Assessing Common Law Fraud

Regardless of whether the reason certain cases are
dismissed is standards set forth in Escobar or because of other
pleading or evidentiary challenges, there is nevertheless a great
body of precedent that is building regarding the impact of Escobar
on implied false certification claims. Beyond the umbrella themes
related to a rigorous and demanding standard, the Supreme
Court seems to be attempting to steer FCA application, which
199 See, e.g., D’Agostino v. EV3, Inc., 845 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2016) (affirming
dismissal based on plaintiff being barred by the public disclosure bar); Hagerty ex rel.
United States v. Cyberonics, Inc., 844 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2016) (affirming dismissal based
on failure to plead with particularity); United States ex rel. Whatley v. Eastwick College,
657 Fed. App’x 89 (3d Cir. 2016).
200 Internal Memorandum from Michael Granston, Director of United State
Dep’t of Justice, Commercial Litigation Branch, Fraud Section, Factors for Evaluating
Dismissal Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A), Internal Memorandum, (Jan. 10, 2018),
https://www.fcadefenselawblog.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/561/2018/01/Memo-forEvaluating-Dismissal-Pursuant-to-31-U-S.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SYG-SB4V].
201 Id. at 1.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 2–3.
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has ballooned into what can be described as “big business” for
the federal government,204 towards a back-to-basics application
akin to common law fraud. As is the case of common law fraud,
the Court’s new analysis advises lower courts that there is no
strict definition of “fraud,” rather the court must look at whether
a particular admission or omission of certain details was a
misrepresentation made for the purpose of misleading or
defrauding.205 The Court’s examples bear this out: contractors
that are selling the government guns, but such guns do not
actually shoot, are perpetuating a fraud and contractors that are
selling the government guns, but are using foreign-made
staplers to staple their invoices as opposed to American-made
staplers, even if in violation of a federal regulation, are not
perpetuating a fraud.206 Thus, the Court is telling relators,
prosecutors, and courts alike that they should stop focusing on
the regulation and the characteristics of the regulation and
instead focus on the act itself and whether such act is intended
to defraud.
There is no doubt that Escobar has changed the manner
in which implied false certification claims are pleaded and the
type of evidence that parties are putting forth in order for the
claims to be successful—or at least to survive the summary
judgment stage. Certainly, the prosecutors’ bar and relators’ bar
are closely monitoring lower court cases analyzing Escobar for
purposes of litigation strategy and careful pleading.
In addition to their watchful eyes, however, there are a
whole host of health care transactional attorneys, compliance
officers, medical coding professionals, and health care
regulatory experts trying to also determine how Escobar is
changing the legal landscape. Specifically, those entities most
commonly subject to the FCA, particularly health care providers
and suppliers, are paying considerably close attention for
purposes of assessing compliance risk and managing legal
liability.207 With thousands of statutes and regulations—both
federal and state—governing the services and operations of
See supra notes 7, 39–40 and accompanying text.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (defining
common law fraud as “[o]ne who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion,
intention or law for the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain from action in
reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss caused to
him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation”).
206 See Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S.
Ct. 1989, 2001–04 (2016).
207 See generally Paul F. Khoury et al., Government Contractors Deal with the
Uncertain Shadow of Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 52
PROCUREMENT LAW. 12 (2017).
204
205
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health care providers and suppliers, such entities might submit
hundreds of claims per day all impliedly certifying compliance
with any number of statutes, rules, and regulations to which
such provider or supplier is subject.208
Based on the Escobar opinion, at least some of these
underlying statutes, rules, and regulations (collectively, the
“regulations”) are clearly material enough that noncompliance
with such regulations could result in FCA liability.209 It is
equally clear, however, that some of these regulations are more
for purposes of dictating how care should be delivered or certain
operations should take place, but are not entirely material to the
government’s payment decision. Trying to now decipher the
distinction between those regulations based on the guidance
from Escobar and the opinions analyzing Escobar, all with
unique facts and unique regulations, may be the biggest
challenge yet to be faced.
One argument consistently averred by defendants prior
to the opinion in Escobar was that to the extent that implied
false certification claims are viable, liability must be limited to
express false certification claims in order to provide defendants
with “fair notice” regarding what might be fraudulent under the
FCA.210 In response to Universal Health Service’s use of this
argument in Escobar, the Court stated:
Universal Health’s approach [of limiting implied false certification
claims to regulations that are expressly designated conditions of
payment] risks undercutting [the FCA’s] policy goals. The
Government might respond by designating every legal requirement
208 Entities that participate in the Medicare program (both providers and
suppliers) are subject to federal Medicare statutes, rules, and regulations as participants.
See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEDICARE ENROLLMENT APPLICATION (CMS855A) 48 (Expires Aug. 2019), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/CMS-Forms/CMS-Forms/
Downloads/cms855a.pdf [http://perma.cc/46CE-ATNE] (“I agree to abide by the Medicare
laws, regulations and program instructions that apply to this provider. The Medicare
laws, regulations and program instructions are available through the Medicare
contractor. I understand that payment of a claim by Medicare is conditioned upon the
claim and the underlying transaction complying with such laws, regulations, and
program instructions . . ., and on the provider’s compliance with all application conditions
of participation in Medicare.”). Entities may also choose—separately—to participate in
state Medicaid programs. Because the Medicaid program is a program that is jointly
operated and funded by the states and the federal government, there are both federal
statues, rules, and regulations that govern Medicaid providers and also state statutes,
rules, and regulations that govern Medicaid providers operating in a particular state.
See generally Federal Policy Guidance, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/
federal-policy-guidance/federal-policy-guidance.html [http://perma.cc/CVN8-MY5Z]; see
also, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-5-102 (2017) et seq.; TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1200-1301 (2016) et seq.; see also Financing & Reimbursement, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.
medicaid.gov/medicaid/financing-and-reimbursement/ [https://perma.cc/235B-JZ8H] (“The
Medicaid program is jointly funded by the federal government and states.”).
209 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1996, 2002–04.
210 Id. at 2002.
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an express condition of payment. But billing parties are often subject
to thousands of complex statutory and regulatory provisions. Facing
False Claims Act liability for violating any of them would hardly help
would-be defendants anticipate and prioritize compliance obligations.
And forcing the Government to expressly designate a provision as a
condition of payment would create further arbitrariness. Under
Universal Health’s view, misrepresenting compliance with a
requirement that the Government expressly identified as a condition
of payment could expose a defendant to liability. Yet, under this theory,
misrepresenting compliance with a condition of eligibility to even
participate in a federal program when submitting a claim would not.211

It is certainly a valid point that to the extent that implied false
certification claims were limited to express conditions of
payment that one reaction from the government could be simply
to identify all claims as conditions of payment.212 It seems
unlikely, however, that CMS would revise the myriad
regulations to designate all regulations as conditions of payment
merely to create liability under the FCA. This is especially true
if the government is truly only interested in litigating FCA
claims that are material to the government’s decision to pay the
claim and there is a genuine interest in preventing parasitic
lawsuits under the FCA. Further, to the extent that all
regulations were reclassified or amended to be expressly
designated as conditions of payment, there would be no need for
a materiality standard or a scienter requirement at all under an
FCA claim.
To the extent that all regulations were expressly
designated as conditions of payment, then essentially all such
regulations would be considered automatically material and all
defendants would have the necessary scienter because they
would be on notice that all regulations are expressly designated
as condition of payment. Thus, two of the most basic, necessary
FCA pleading requirements—excluding other general pleading
requirements such as particularity or failure to state a claim or
other procedural challenges such as the public disclosure
bar213—would be met without any requirement that the plaintiffs
have to actually prove such requirements.214 Given the efforts
Id.
Id.
213 See generally Joel D. Hesch, Restating the “Original Source Exception” to the
False Claims Act’s “Public Disclosure Bar” in Light of the 2010 Amendments, 51 U. RICH.
L. REV. 991 (2017); Aaron Rubin, To Present Bills or Not to Present? An In-Depth Analysis
of the Burden of Pleading in Qui Tam Suits, 8 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 467 (2012).
214 The Court in Escobar discussed the relationship between the requirements
of materiality and scienter in connection with a FCA claim. The Court stated, “A
defendant can have ‘actual knowledge’ that a condition is material without the
Government expressly calling it a condition of payment.” Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2001.
“What matters is not the label the Government attaches to a requirement, but whether
211
212
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over the years to ensure the proper balance between capturing
fraud against the federal government and protecting against
parasitic lawsuits, it seems an unlikely result that Congress or
administrative agencies would adopt a position that would make
all regulations preconditions to payment or effectively eliminate
the need to affirmatively prove materiality and scienter.
B.

Escobar’s Effect on Compliance and Risk Management

The question remains, then, even if it may be unlikely
that the federal government would actually have adopted the
tact of expressly designating each regulation as a condition of
payment, how will the Court’s rejection of a bright-line rule
under Escobar affect compliance and risk management? Will
contractors be able to adequately assess risk and prioritize
compliance based on the guidance and dictates of Escobar?
Because the health care industry represents the entity with the
largest FCA remittance to the federal government,215 this
industry seems an appropriate example for purposes of
exploring the potential compliance impact of the Escobar
opinion. With the thousands of regulations that apply to health
care providers and suppliers, compliance programs and
prospective efforts to reduce legal liability—primarily related to
billing and collection—have become a fairly substantial part of
the operation of health care entities.216 Indeed, each year, the
Office of Inspector General of the Department of Health and
Human Services releases work plans that provide information
the defendant knowingly violated a requirement that the defendant knows is material
to the Government’s payment decision.” Id. at 1996. To the extent that the Court had
adopted a position that implied false certification claims were required to be conditions
of payment, this would meet both materiality and scienter requirements.
215 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
216 The Office of Inspector General has a webpage dedicated to compliance
titled, “Compliance 101” in which it advises providers and suppliers about “health care
fraud and abuse laws and the consequences of violating them.” Compliance Education
Materials: Compliance 101, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/101/
[http://perma.cc/VX7B-HZP7]. Compliance and the need for compliance programs has its
roots in the 1990s and stems largely from language in the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s
promulgation of Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations, which would reduce
sanctions against a corporation if such corporation adopted “an effective program to
prevent and detect violations of law.” Thomas E. Bartrum & L. Edward Bryant, Jr., The
Brave New World of Health Care Compliance Programs, 6 ANNALS HEALTH L. 51, 55
(1997) (quoting UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (1995)).
The requirement for an effective compliance program was tested in the settlement
proposal to the Delaware Supreme Court in which the court approved a settlement
proposal because the court found that that Board of Directors for Caremark
International, Inc. was not aware that the company had been violating certain provisions
of a federal antibribery law and once the board discovered such issue, it exercised
reasonable oversight in accordance with its existing and effective compliance program.
See In re Caremark Intern., Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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and guidance to various types of providers and suppliers for the
sole purpose of informing such industries about the
government’s concerns regarding legal compliance priorities for
that particular industry.217
With the myriad regulations governing operations and
the exceedingly varied operations of health care entities,218 the
simple reality is that it is exceptionally difficult for providers
and suppliers to be in constant and complete compliance with all
health care regulations at all times. This can be seen from the
Office of Inspector General (OIG) Work Plan and compliance
guidance itself; at any given time, for any given sector of health
care, there are a number of different concerns that the OIG cites
to regarding what its area of compliance focus is for that
particular time period.219 Thus, compliance offices must assess
all of the various risk factors identified and then not only correct
the noncompliance and address the processes going forward, but
also prioritize the order in which such action steps will occur.
For example, to the extent that a compliance officer uncovers
four to five risk areas during a routine internal audit—or worse
yet during an audit by a Medicare contractor or the OIG—the
compliance officer must determine which of the risk areas
should be addressed first and the manner in which the issues
will be addressed.220
217 See Work Plan, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/
reports-and-publications/workplan/ [http://perma.cc/2QLP-5MAK]. “The Office of Inspector
General’s (OIG) work planning process is dynamic and adjustments are made
throughout the year to meet priorities and anticipate and respond to emerging issues
with the resources available. . . . The OIG Work Plan sets forth various projects
including OIG audits and evaluations that are underway or planned to be addressed
during the fiscal year and beyond by OIG’s Office of Audit Services and Office of
Evaluation and Inspectors.” Id.
218 A large hospital or health system might operate an inpatient hospital,
outpatient clinics, post-acute services, ancillary services (such as imaging services), or
other physician services and would be responsible for billing and compliance for each
of these types of services that are all governed by unique and distinct rules and
regulations. Even if owned by (and all services billed by) a single legal entity, each
type of entity is subject to separate Medicare regulations and applicable state
regulations. For example, a hospital operating in the state of Tennessee alone would
be required to comply with applicable state law. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-111601 et seq. (2017) (establishing a health care facility); id. § 68-11-201 et seq.; TENN.
COMP. R. & REGS. 1200-08-01. The hospital would also have to comply with applicable
federal law. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 485.50 et seq. (2017) (governing conditions of
participation for hospitals). As such health system may increase services, additional
laws and regulations become applicable.
219 The most recent Work Plan, updated in July 17, 2017, lists six different topics
in its “What’s New” area. See Work Plan, supra note 217; see also Compliance Guidance,
U.S DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/compliance-guidance/
index.asp [http://perma.cc/2FBS-23BG] (providing links to compliance program guidance
for nursing homes, researchers, hospitals, ambulance suppliers, etc.).
220 See Bartrum & Bryant, supra note 216, at 60–61 (“Few facilities, however,
have the resources necessary to adopt an all-inclusive compliance program in one fell
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Typically, compliance offices can prioritize risk based on
the level of legal exposure for the risk areas. For instance,
discovery of errors in billing processes that have resulted in
higher reimbursement than is warranted or discovery that a
number of leases with referring physicians have expired would
result not only in immediate action both to correct the errors on
a go-forward basis, but also likely assessment of whether any
amounts need to be remitted to the government for
overpayments.221 Thus, what may or may not be actionable
under the FCA is of vital importance to a compliance office or
officer when assessing risk and trying to prioritize how to and in
what manner to assess such risk.
While the result in Escobar may be a better assessment
of the kind of fraud that the government is actually concerned
about preventing under the FCA, which may ultimately lead to
less arbitrary application of the FCA, it is nevertheless a larger
challenge for the purpose of utilizing the opinion as guidance on
whether a particular instance of noncompliance is or is not
actionable under the FCA. Based on the Escobar guidance, it
seems that a contracting entity must, at all times, assess the
entity’s own knowledge about the government’s position on
regulations whether or not the government has communicated
in some manner (thus putting the entity “on notice”) about if a
particular regulation is material to the government’s decision to
pay. Likewise, the entity must monitor the government for
communication, both personal to the company as demonstrated
by analysis in Triple Canopy, Inc.222 and on a more general level
as demonstrated by analysis in Dynamic Visions, Inc.223
swoop. There are just too many laws that impact health care facilities. Accordingly, it is
necessary to prioritize. For most hospitals, Medicare billing, especially in the area of
clinical laboratories, is a concern. Accordingly, a compliance program should be
implemented for this area first.”).
221 Once a billing error has been discovered by an entity, retaining any amounts
that have been paid to the entity in excess of amounts the entity is actually owed are
considered an overpayment. Under the FCA, it is a violation of the FCA to retain such
amounts any longer than sixty days from the date such overpayments were discovered.
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2012). Similarly, permitting a referring physician to lease
space without a lease in place—subject to certain exceptions such as certain holdover
allowances—may be a violation of either or both the Antikickback Statute and the Stark
Law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(1).
222 Communication that is “personal” to the company is specific information
that may be communicated regarding its particular behavior. In Badr, part of what the
Fourth Circuit relied on in arriving at its conclusion was that the government had not
renewed its contract with the defendant company and that the DOJ had intervened in
the case. These are communications that are specific to Triple Canopy, Inc. itself, not
general communication about a statute or rule as it might apply across the industry. See
United States ex rel. Badr v. Triple Canopy, Inc., 857 F.3d 174, 179 (4th Cir. 2017).
223 More
general communication is communication that the federal
government, specifically the Department of Health and Human Services through CMS
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Additionally, the entity must monitor for communication
both prior to the alleged fraud and potentially also after the
alleged fraud—such as the cancelling of a contract or decision to
intervene in the case224—to determine whether the government
has communicated in some manner regarding its position on
whether it will reimburse despite certain noncompliance. While
the federal government (and state governments to some extent)
publishes guidance and compliance resources, such as the OIG
Work Plan and Compliance Program Guidance for various
industries,225 there is no doubt that the government cannot and
does not address or communicate about each regulation on a
regular basis. Moreover, it is not entirely clear what sort of
communication from the government would be sufficient to
constitute materiality to the extent that such communication
was not specific as to materiality for purposes of FCA. As can be
seen from some of the cases mentioned above, there have been
cases in which the plaintiff did provide evidence of at least some
government communication, but such communication was not
sufficient to constitute materiality.226
The DOJ has subsequently issued an internal
memorandum, since made public, which perhaps will provide
some clarity for courts regarding the types of communication on
which courts can rely for purposes of application of Escobar’s
materiality test.227 While not specifically tied to FCA cases, the
memorandum was issued for the purpose of instructing DOJ
attorneys about the impact of what the memorandum refers to
as “guidance documents” and their use by the DOJ in connection
with litigation.228 By way of background, the Attorney General
had issued an earlier memorandum on November 16, 2017, which
prohibited departments “from issuing guidance documents that
effectively bind the public without undergoing the notice-andcomment rulemaking process.”229 Former Associate Attorney
and OIG, communicates about a particular rule, regulation, or compliance within a
certain industry. See United States v. Dynamic Visions, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 3d 1, 16
(D.D.C. 2016) (presenting evidence from the Medicaid director about statements she had
made regarding the Medicaid department’s position regarding whether a regulation is
material to payment).
224 See Badr, 857 F.3d at 179.
225 See Compliance Guidance, supra note 219; Work Plan, supra note 217.
226 See, e.g., cases set forth in supra note 180.
227 Internal Memorandum from Assoc. Att’y Gen, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Head
of Civil Litigating Components, U.S. Att’ys, Limited Use of Agency Guidance Documents
in Affirmative Civil Enforcement Cases (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/file/
1028756/download [https://perma.cc/TLY7-A6QV].
228 Id. at 1.
229 Id. The memorandum defines “guidance documents” as “any agency
statement of general applicability and future effect, whether styled as ‘guidance’ or
otherwise, that is designed to advise parties outside the federal Executive Branch about
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General, Rachel Brand, states in the memorandum that the
directives set forth in a November 16, 2017, memorandum
issued by Attorney General Jeff Sessions applies to the DOJ
litigators for purposes of determining the use of guidance
documents in affirmative civil enforcement (ACE) actions.230
Specifically, the 2018 memorandum states, “effective immediately
for ACE cases, the [DOJ] may not use its enforcement authority to
effectively convert agency guidance documents into binding rules.
Likewise, [DOJ] litigators may not use noncompliance with
guidance documents as a basis for violations of applicable law in
ACE cases.”231 The 2018 memorandum notes that while such
guidance documents cannot be used as if they were binding law,
they can be used as evidence to show that a party “had the
requisite knowledge” of whatever legal mandate as may be
referenced in the guidance documents.232 The 2018 memorandum
will have the effect of likely reducing the number of cases that meet
Escobar standards, on the basis that the guidance documents will
not be able to be applied in the same ways as if they were a rule or
law. But, the intended use of the documents is to aid in being
able to prove knowledge of compliance requirements, and thus,
knowledge of one’s actions for failure to comply.233 While these
documents might assist in proof of scienter, they might not help
in addressing the issues noted above regarding whether such
communication is sufficiently clear to indicate materiality.
C.

Need for Clarification on Timing

Similarly, it is not entirely clear as to whether the
government’s actions can be either general prospective
communication or retrospective communication based on the
misrepresentation itself. In United States ex rel. Petratos v.
Genentech, Inc., the Third Circuit found that although the
regulation in question was expressly designated as a condition
legal rights and obligations. This memorandum does not apply to adjudicatory actions
that do not have aim or effect of bind anyone beyond the parties involved, documents
informing the public of agency enforcement priorities or factors considered in exercising
prosecutorial discretion, or internal directives, memoranda, training materials for
agency personnel.” Id. at n.1.
230 Id. (“‘Affirmative civil enforcement’ refers to the Department’s filing of civil
lawsuits on behalf of the United States to recover government money lost to fraud or
other misconduct or to impose penalties for violations of Federal health, safety, civil
rights or environmental laws. For example, this memorandum applies when the
Department is enforcing the False Claims Act, alleging that a party knowingly submitted
a false claim for payment by falsely certifying compliance with material statutory or
regulatory requirements.”).
231 Id. at 2.
232 Id.
233 Id.
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of payment (potentially an example of a prospective
communication regarding materiality), the plaintiff had failed to
provide evidence that the misrepresentations were material to
the government’s payment decision because the plaintiff conceded
that the government did continue to pay the claims.234 In contrast,
Abbott v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc. relied on an
investigation and report conducted by the Department of Interior
regarding some specific reporting practices in order to prove that
the government’s lack of punishment or change in practices
following the issuing of the report was insufficient in showing that
compliance with the regulations in question was material.235
Thus, trying to decipher the type of communication that
will suffice for purposes of proving materiality and at what point
such communications are rendered to health care contractors for
purposes of the filing of an FCA action appears easier in a
courtroom setting—with ample time for the court to consider the
various issues and consequences before making a determination—
than in the fast-paced and multifaceted setting of the compliance
office. This is not to say, however, that the Court’s Escobar
decision should have either completely rejected the possibility of
implied false certification claims or, alternatively, adopted the
position that all implied false certification claims must be based
on regulations that are expressly designated as conditions of
payment. Certainly, there are cases like that of Yaruska Rivera
in which the misrepresentations or fraudulent behavior are so
egregious that it would seem to fly in the face of the entire
intention behind the FCA to claim that simply because the fraud
was against the law instead of related to a specific fact that it
should not be actionable.236 Likewise, consistent with the Court’s
stated concerns (and what would have also resulted in a
dismissal in the Escobar case), adopting a bright-line rule that
limits the applicability of implied false certification claims may
arbitrarily create liability for certain regulations over the other,
with no basis in the origins or underpinnings of the FCA.

234 United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech Inc., 855 F.3d 481, 489–90
(3d Cir. 2017).
235 Abbot v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 851 F.3d 384, 387–88 (5th Cir. 2017).
236 It should be noted that Escobar misrepresentations could be classified as
both factual falsities and legal falsities because not only was the clinic in violation of
application Medicaid regulations because they did not have the appropriate and properly
licensed staff as required by law, but it also lied about the factual nature of the
credentials of the individuals working at the clinic. This is characterized as a legal
falsity, however, because of how the claim was brought under the FCA and the specific
regulation that the clinic was alleged to have violated. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v.
United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1997–98 (2016).

1274

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:4

Thus, this article does not argue that Escobar was
wrongly decided or that adopting a different position entirely
would have been a better result. Rather, it argues that
understanding when a regulation may or may not be material
under the FCA is extremely important not just for litigants, but
for health care entities and their compliance offices and that the
Escobar Court’s guidance does not go far enough in providing
sufficient details about what liability may lie between guns that
do not shoot and foreign-made staplers. While lower court cases
are starting to provide a bit more detail regarding what types of
noncompliance might look like closer to errant guns and what
types of noncompliance look more like foreign staplers, it may
take quite some time for courts to arrive at a consensus position
on certain regulations or types of regulations. Moreover, to the
extent that most cases involve situations in which the federal
government has declined to intervene, the majority of cases are
dismissed prior to trial and thus it might be easier to determine
what is not material as opposed to what is material.237 Through
this process, health care entities are thrust into the position of
assuming, as least absent very clear evidence to the contrary,
that noncompliance with most regulations could be material
under the FCA. Entities can feel some comfort in the fact that
Escobar seems to impose a stricter standard on claims, but that
is not helpful for purposes of trying to assess and prioritize risk
and compliance concerns in real time.
Given the nature of FCA claims and the time that it takes
to bring an FCA claim to resolution, this lack of clarity may also
affect settlements—the primary means by which most FCA
cases are resolved.238 While Escobar enables potential
defendants the possibility of arguing against liability, even to
the extent that the underlying rule or regulation is an express
condition of payment, the opinion also enables the DOJ to argue
that nearly any regulation could be sufficiently material for
purpose of establishing an FCA claim.239 Without sufficient
clarity regarding materiality and an ability to manage risk,
entities under investigation might feel greater pressure to
settle—despite the possibility of imposition of a stricter standard
in court—because the scope of regulations that are potentially
material is broader. To the extent that parties feel compelled to
settle because of a lack of either knowledge or confidence
See FRAUD STATISTICS, supra note 43, at 1.
See FACT SHEET, supra note 57.
239 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1995 (holding that implied false certification can be a
basis for liability, but it is not limited to claims based only on conditions of payment, but
can also include claims based on conditions of participation).
237
238
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regarding what may be actionable under the FCA, the possibility
of parasitic lawsuits will greatly increase.
Moreover, to the extent that materiality can be proven
based on evidence of the government’s communication subsequent
to the misrepresentations, such as whether or not the government
intervened in the case as in Triple Canopy, Inc., the communication
between the parties prior to the unsealing of the case and whether
a defendant can convince the government to intervene may become
even more critical.240 To the extent government intervention is
proof of materiality, then it would seem that all the government
has to do during settlement negotiations is make clear to the
defendant its intention to intervene and the defendant will likely
feel pressure to settle or face the possibility of a long and
protracted litigation—at least unless there are other grounds for
dismissal at the pleading stage.
While parties can simply wait and monitor cases in the
hopes that enough clarity eventually evolves from the district
courts and courts of appeals as they analyze Escobar, the more
expedient solution might be to encourage greater and more
specific clarity from CMS and other state agencies regarding
what they really believe to be material. To the extent that this
communication is precise and directed, this could be helpful for
providers and suppliers to appropriately manage risk and
compliance initiatives. If CMS and other state agencies share
the same opinions about Escobar and how it should impact FCA
liability as the DOJ, however, it seems unlikely that this clarity
is coming. The DOJ is trying to convince courts to reject those
aspects of Escobar that would result in greater scrutiny of
claims, while at the same time embracing the broader view that
implied false certification claims encompass both conditions of
payment and conditions of participation.241 Nevertheless, greater
communication and clarity regarding materiality remains
potentially the most expedient and efficient way of providing
some much needed detail and transparency for compliance offices
about how to assess what may or may not be actionable under the
FCA and thus prioritize compliance initiatives and legal risk.
Absent this communication, materiality under the FCA may be
clear in the more extreme and egregious instances of
noncompliance (or alternatively in the most obviously insignificant
instances of noncompliance) only, but will remain opaque in the
vast amount of the cases in the middle.

240
241

United States ex rel. Badr v. Triple Canopy, Inc., 857 F.3d 174, 179 (4th Cir. 2017).
See supra notes 196–99 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS states: “a misrepresentation
must be material in order that the law may take notice of it as a
fraud.”242 It is with this backdrop that the Supreme Court tried
to ensure that application of the FCA was consistent with its
roots: the statute was established to capture fraud against the
federal government and that “fraud” is and should be based on
the common law principles of what courts know and recognize
fraud to be.243 Further, under such common law principles, the
legal system is only concerned about fraud that may cause
another to take action to their detriment that they otherwise
would not have taken but for the fraud.244 And thus, the Court
through Escobar is steering lower courts into a back-to-basics
approach in which they examine not the type of regulation or the
section of a particular code, rule book, or statute in which the
regulation happens to be located, but the regulation itself and
the government’s communication regarding whether that
regulation is or is not material to its payment decision. Such
approach does seem most consistent with the origins of the FCA
and a good way of assuring that courts and prosecutors stay
focused on fraud or misrepresentations that seem to go to the
“essence of the bargain.”245 Despite all of this, there are
significant challenges in the type of approach that the Court has
adopted in Escobar.
While it is clear that violation of a law, rule, or regulation
that is part and parcel of the necessary performance of the
contract (e.g., if you are selling the government guns, the guns
should shoot, even if there is not a statute or regulation that
expressly provides that failure to comply would result in the
government’s refusal to pay the claim) is material and that a
violation of a law, rule, or regulation that is largely unrelated to
the necessary performance of the contract (like whether or not
the contractor is using American-made office products) is not
material, it is not entirely clear what precisely stands in the
middle of these two extremes. While being able to argue this
point in the context of litigation strategy might be less
problematic, trying to use the words of Escobar and some of the
interpretations of the lower courts to determine what the
compliance risk might be related to a discovery of noncompliance
WILLISTON, supra note 113, at § 69:12.
Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002–03.
244 See WILLISTON, supra note 113, at § 69:12.
245 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003, n.5 (quoting Junius Constr. Co. v. Cohen, 178
N.E. 672, 674 (N.Y. 1931)).
242
243

2018]

GUNS THAT DO NOT SHOOT & FOREIGN STAPLERS

1277

is significantly more difficult. Although adoption of a bright line
may have led to arbitrary results, there does need to be an
increased emphasis on assisting government contractors,
especially providers and suppliers who participate in federal
health care programs, with a more clearly articulated position
on the types of noncompliance that lie in the mysterious middle
of “material.”
Given the types of cases and claims under the FCA that
are typically reviewed and analyzed by courts, and also the slow
and rather confusing and meandering method and process of
developing guidance through case law, it seems necessary to be
able to assist compliance offices and companies in prioritizing
and assessing risk. This can be done by providing more detail
and comment regarding those regulations that CMS and state
agencies are truly most concerned. Not only will this
communication be key for ongoing compliance and general
operations, but it will further guard against dangers that
contractors will be compelled in almost all instances to settle for
fear of government intervention and how that might impact
materiality. Providing this increased communication and
direction will assist in assuring that the FCA continues for years
to come and strikes the right balance between capturing fraud
against the government while protecting innocent actors against
parasitic lawsuits.

